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Abstract 
 
This study analyses the Andalusian coastal governance, with special emphasis on the cofradía 
co-management system, and the distribution of rights in the Striped venus clam (Chamelea 
gallina) fishery in a case study focused on the fleets of mechanized dredge in the gulf of Cádiz, 
south-western Spain. The objective is to evaluate if the coastal Andalusian governance and the 
distribution of fishing rights are contributing or not to the sustainability of the fishery of Striped 
venus. The governance assessment tool developed by the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
has been used for analysis if the attributes of the coastal governance are contribution to the 
sustainability of the fishery. Also, the effect of the fishing right over fishermen individual 
behaviour has been estimated using the property rights´ economic characteristics assessment, 
combining methodologies used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the European Commission (EC). The results shows that lack of 
cohesion self-organization and cooperation between the cofradías of the gulf of Cádiz, 
additionally to a poor enforcement, are making the cofradía co-management system ineffective. 
Moreover, no real fishing communal rights re in place and the individual fishing license system 
has low exclusivity. Additionally, the security provided by the right can also be threatened due 
to the ineffective co-management and enforcement. This general weakness of property right 
can be leading the fishers to act in a non-sustainable way. 
 
Key words: governance, co-management, rights, sustainability. 
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Resumen 
 
Este estudio analiza la gobernanza costera andaluza, haciendo especial hincapié en el sistema 
de co-gestión con las cofradías, así como la distribución de derechos de pesca en la pesquería 
de chirla (Chamelea gallina) en un caso de estudio centrado en las flotas de draga hidráulica 
en el golfo de Cádiz, situado al sur-oeste de España. El objetivo es evaluar si la gobernanza 
costera andaluza y la distribución de derechos de pesca están contribuyendo a la sostenibilidad 
de la pesca de chirla. La herramienta de evaluación de gobernanza desarrollada por el 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) ha sido utilizada para analizar si los atributos de la 
gobernanza costera española están contribuyendo a la sostenibilidad de la pesca. A su vez, los 
efectos de los derechos de pesca sobre el comportamiento individual de los pescadores se ha 
estimado mediante la evaluación de las características económicas de los derechos de 
propiedad, combinando metodologías utilizadas por la Organización para la Cooperación y el 
Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) y de la Comisión Europea (CE). Los resultados muestran que 
la falta de cohesión, auto-organización y cooperación entre las cofradías del golfo de Cádiz, 
así como el la dificultad a la hora de hacer cumplir la legislación vigente, han llevado a un 
sistema de cogestión con las cofradías ineficiente. Además, no hay verdaderos derechos de 
pesca por comunidad y el sistema individual de licencias de pesca tiene una baja exclusividad. 
A eso hay que sumarle que la seguridad que proporcionan los derechos de pesca puede estar 
siendo amenazada por la ineficiencia de la cogestión y el bajo cumplimiento de la legislación. 
La debilidad general de los derechos de pesca puede estar haciendo que los pescadores se 
comporten de forma poco sostenible. 
 
Palabras clave: gobernanza, cogestión, derechos, sostenibilidad. 
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Résumé  
 
Cette étude analyse la gouvernance côtière andalouse, en mettant l’accent sur le système de 
cogestion avec les cofradías, ainsi que la distribution des droits de pêche dans la pêcherie de 
Petite praire (Chamelea gallina) dans un cas d'étude qui se concentre sur les flottes de drague 
mécanisée du golfe de Cadix, au sud-ouest de l'Espagne. L'objectif de cette étude est de 
déterminer si la gouvernance côtière espagnole et la distribution des droits de pêche contribuent 
à la durabilité de la pêcherie de Striped venus. L'outil d'évaluation de la gouvernance développé 
par l´Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) a été utilisé pour analyser si les attributs de la 
gouvernance côtière espagnole participent à la durabilité de la pêcherie. Par ailleurs, les effets 
des droits de pêche sur le comportement individuel des pêcheurs ont été estimés à travers 
l'évaluation des caractéristiques économiques des droits de propriété, en associant les 
méthodologies utilisées par l´Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques 
(OCDE) et par la Commission Européenne (CE). Les résultats montrent que le manque de 
cohésion, d´autorégulation et de coopération entre les cofradías du golfe de Cadix, ainsi que la 
difficulté lors de l´application de la réglementation en vigueur, ont abouti à un système de 
cogestion avec les cofradías inefficace. De plus, il n'existe pas de vrais droits de pêche par 
communauté et le système individuel de licence de pêche est peu exclusif. En outre, la sécurité 
garantie par les droits de pêche peut être menacée par l'inefficacité de la cogestion et par la 
non-application de la loi. La faiblesse généralisée des droits de pêche peut inciter les pêcheurs 
à adopter un comportement peu durable. 
 
Mots-Clés: gouvernance, cogestion, droits, soutenabilité. 
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 : Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In 1968, Harding argued that individual interest of the users over a common resource would 
end with a withdrawal race in order to maximize profits. In the case of fisheries this would 
cause a “race for fish”. As solution to the tragedy of the “tragedy of the commons”, he 
suggested either to privatize such common property or to allocate the right to enter it. 
 
On the contrary, there are critical voices that do not fully support Harding’s thesis. Ostrom 
(2000) described several cases in which the lack of limited access or private property has not 
provoked the depletion of the resource mostly because the implication of the community in (1) 
the management of the resource and (2) access to the resource. Cultural and indigenous 
knowledge, compliance generation over generation and customary rules have ensured long-
term use of the resource. For example, several fisheries in Pacific Ocean Countries have shown 
that customary tenure management can also provide good environmental outcomes (Aswani, 
2005; Ruddle & Hviding, 1992; Dahl, 1988). However, customary tenure management seems 
to fail once the fishery improves technically (Dahl, 1988), and resources are depleted in the 
absence of effective governance as soon as the demand outstrips the biological capacity of 
sustaining fish stocks (FAO, 2016a).  
 
Restrictions to open access are an essential condition for effective governance. In order to make 
conservation more likely, fishing rights should be allocated for specifying and constraining 
whom accede the resource (Charles, 2009). Nevertheless, to allocate fishing rights is not always 
sufficient. Rights, and institutions that surround these rights, need to create a set of incentives 
that encourage limiting fishing effort to what is consistent with the long-term optimal, 
sustainable productivity of the resource (FAO, 2016a). As said by Grafton et al. (2006), 
sustainability in the fishery cannot be achieved with inappropriate individual incentives and 
ineffective governance. 
 
1.2 Governance and co-management 
 
When talking about governance, one should be conscious that is a broad concept and there is 
not always a consensus defining it (Kooiman et al. 2008). Governance is defined by Juda (1999) 
as: 
 
“The formal and informal arrangements, institutions, and mores which determine how 
resources or an environment are utilized (right of access and harvest, management); 
how problems and opportunities are evaluated and analysed (conflict resolution); what 
behaviour is deemed acceptable or forbidden; and what rules and sanctions are applied 
to affect the pattern of resource and environmental use (enforcement).” 
 
Other authors have given more importance to the governing interaction between systems to be 
governed (human system and natural system), and governing system (values, institutions and 
problems to be solved) involved in governance (Kooiman et al., 2008). Hanna (1999) identifies 
it as “the interaction between the institutional environment, property rights and individual 
behaviours that contribute to the outcomes of the fishery”. For Kooiman & Bavinck (2005) 
governance, or interactive governance as they call it, is “the whole of public as well as private 
interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. It includes the 
formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions 
that enable them.”  
 
In case of fisheries, that interaction should be understood as the way that the actors of the 
governance system interact for managing the resource.  
 
The management spectrum is broad, with a high number of possibilities available when 
governing fisheries. Options go from the top down decision processes of a government 
centralized management to community self-governance (Figure 1). Between both, different 
states of co-management can be found, and the degree of it will depend on the cooperation and 
sharing of management duties between government and fishery stakeholders (Sen & Nielsen, 
1996; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997), been possible to have a strong intervention of the different 
actors in the fishery management.  
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of co-management arrangements (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). 
There is general consensus that the rigidity of the top-down management does not fit with the 
reality of the fishing sector and its diversity, complexity and dynamism (Hanna, 1999; Mahon 
et al. 2007; Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009). In this regard, co-management of fisheries and the 
opportunities that co-management creates for facing the governance challenges have been 
discussed widely since the 90’s (Sen & Nielsen, 1996; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997; Pomeroy & 
Rivera-Guieb, 2005; Berkes, 2009; Evans et al, 2011; Cinner et al. 2012).  
 
Several studies have shown that certain characteristics have to be present for co-management 
to be successful: 
 Boundaries have to be well defined and should be small if possible (Pomeroy, 2001; 
Jentoft, 2009).  
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 There is a need of clear and strong leadership (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997; Pomeroy, 
2001; Gutierrez et al. 2011).  
 The fishing community have to have access to financial resources and to capacity 
building (Pomeroy, 2001; Gutierrez et al. 2011).  
 The management has to be transparent (Pomeroy, 2001; Jentoft, 2009).  
 There has to be a clear membership and social cohesion (Pomeroy, 2001; Gutierrez et 
al. 2011; Crona et al., 2016).   
 
Additional importance has been given to enforcement (Pomeroy 2001; Gutierrez, et al. 2011; 
Crona et al., 2016), since a higher participation of the fishers in the fishery it is not enough for 
achieving sustainability (Hauk, 2008; Jentoft, 1998; Cinner et al, 2011). Enforcement is 
necessary for preventing opportunistic conduct, which is more likely to be imitated when more 
fishers do not comply. The opportunity cost should be as high as possible to make compliance 
the preferred option (Roncin et al., 2004; Cinner et al. 2011).  
 
1.3 Rights-based approaches 
 
The nexus between co-management and clear access and harvest rights has also been observed 
in some of the previous studies (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997; Pomeroy, 2001; Gutierrez et al. 
2011), showing that allocation of rights can increase the possibility of attaining sustainable 
yields. 
 
Since the early 60’s, the use of a variety fishing rights as tool for managing the fisheries has 
increase. The rights-based approaches to management (RBAs), as aimed to adjust and control 
the fleet and the catch for the sake of sustainability (Scott, 2000). 
 
That said, there are many types of RBAs. Sometimes polemical due to its political component 
(Charles, 2009), the RBA) used (from community rights to individual right) should rely on the 
needs of the fishery (biological, social, economic) and of the resources at disposition of the 
managers. A merged description of the many types of fishing rights is given using the 
definitions provided by Huppert (2005) and the OCDE (Le Gallic, 2006): 
 
Input controls: 
 Limited Licenses (LL): licenses which are attached to a vessel, to the owner, or to both 
and have to be limited in number and applied to a specific stock or fishery to be 
considered as market-like. 
 Individual effort quotas (IE): Rights are attached to the quantity of effort unit that a 
fisher can employ for a given period. 
 Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURF): Allocation of a certain area of the ocean to 
a single user, usually a group, who then undertakes fishing by allocating rights to users 
within the group 
 
Output controls: 
 Individual quotas (IQ): Provide a right to catch a given quantity of fish from a particular 
stock, or, more usually, a percentage of a Total Allowable Catch (TAC). It can be 
transferable or not.  
 Community-based catch quotas (CQ): Catch quotas are attributed to a “fishing 
community” with decisions on allocation of rights within the community taken on a 
cooperative basis. 
 Vessel catch limits (VCL): Restrict the amount of catch that each vessel can land for a 
given period of time (week, month or year) or per trip 
 
No matter if through individual or community rights, the RBA try to stimulate sustainability 
incentives through secure and definable rights (Grafton et al., 2006; Hilborn, 2005). Theoretical 
work support its use arguing that secure and long term property rights should provide long-
term incentives for sustainability, additionally to economic efficiency (Scott, 1989; Scott, 
2000; Anderson, 2000; Anderson, 2007). 
 
Good results have been observed in fisheries with higher quality of property rights (Le Gallic, 
2006), although economic efficiency is not always obtain (Parkes et al., 2009) neither recovery 
of the stocks and the achievement of sustainable yields (Chu, 2009; Beddington et al., 2007). 
Additionally, the social effects and the impact over employment of the fishing sector provoked 
by the RBA can differ depending of the type of fishing right allocated (Grafton et al., 2006; 
Olson, 2011; Hilborn, 2007).  
 
1.4 Spanish governance 
 
In Spain, the coastal fishing resource is managed through co-management. The co-management 
was established with the approval of the Spanish government of the role of the “cofradías” 
(Spanish fisher´s guilds) as Public law Corporations, having the state delegated tasks of an 
administrative character as the management of catch and sales statistics, vessel registration, the 
collection of certain taxes, and control of the first stage of the commercialization process 
(Symes et al. 2003). Influence and power between the state and the fishing sector seems to be 
balanced (Symes et al. 2003).  
 
The cofradías have been operating under a TURF system even before economists established 
the intellectual concept (Alegret 1998; Franquesa, 2004), and have their own recognized 
territorial jurisdictions, over which they exercise this representation in exclusivity (Alegret, 
1998). Since the 60’s the cofradías have been important institutions for managing coastal 
fishing resources. However, the roles of the cofradía have being lately changing (Alegret, 1998, 
1999a, 1999b, 2002). Twenty years have passed since Alegret (1998) pointed that  
“there is an increasing difficulty regarding to the governability of the fishing sector, not 
because the non-compliance of regulations, poaching, etc. but because of serious and 
deep structural problems that are making the actual representation, participation and 
legitimation system obsolete against the changes due to the capitalization of the sector, 
the transformation of the market and the continuous deployment of the resource.” 
According to Alegret (2009) situation has not changed. It seems that the actual cofradía system 
and Spanish governance is not contributing to the sustainability of the resource, excluding some 
punctual cases (Molares & Freire, 2003). 
 
1.5 Objective of the thesis 
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The objective of this thesis is to evaluate if the coastal Andalusian governance and the 
distribution of fishing rights are contributing or not to the sustainability of the fishery of Striped 
venus in the gulf of Cádiz. The Striped venus clam fishery, considered an artisanal fisherie by 
the Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente (Ministry of 
Agriculture & Fisheries, Food & Environment - MAPAMA), (Cortés, 2016), is one of the most 
importants fisheries economicaly of the in the Autonomous Region of Andalucía (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Top 10 species by value in Andalucía, 2015. 
    2015 
SPECIES FAO Weight (Kg.) Value (€) 
SARDINE PIL 8,804,577 15,844,611 
EUROPEAN ANCHOVY ANE 7,099,393 14,363,420 
STRIPED VENUS SVE 4,570,273 13,093,545 
COMMON OCTOPUS OCC 2,388,983 11,010,642 
SWORDFISH SWO 1,531,942 9,034,981 
DEEP-WATER ROSE 
SHRIMP 
DPS 435,787 7,594,920 
SENEGALESE HAKE HKM 3,153,575 6,474,131 
RED SHRIMP ARA 170,937 5,656,288 
PACIFIC CHUB 
MACKEREL 
MAS 9,468,589 5,209,318 
EUROPEAN HAKE HKE 772,040 3,965,723 
Source: Data from Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural of the Junta de Andalucía. 
The fisherie of the Striped venus has suffered two major closures in the last 10 years (figure 
2), the first one in 2011 and the most recent in 2016 due to the bad state of fishing resource.  
 
 
Figure 2: Production of Striped venus from 2007 to 2016 (Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural de 
la J.A., 2017) 
7 
 
First, the fishery is described, including the study site, the state of the resource, the fishing 
fleet, governance system and the different actors , putting special emphasis in the cofradías. 
This description is followed by the use of the governance assessment tool developed by the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). Additionally, an economic analysis of the characteristics 
of the RBA is done. The combination of both methodologies provide the means for evaluating 
if the governance and the interests provided by the RBA of this particular fishery is contributing 
to the current biological state of the fishery or  not.  
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 Methodology 
 
Good governance should provide the governing structure and the tools for the different actors 
to interact with the environment in order to profit the opportunities that this one provides. 
However, without well-defined fishing rights, the wrong incentives could be stimulated 
resulting to bad fishing practices. 
 
On the contrary, even if the RBA in place should provide (theoretically) good incentives for 
sustainable practices, a higher quality of the four characteristics previously commented will 
not always lead to the accomplishment of the objectives of the fishery. 
 
If the governance structure and tools are not the appropriated, the information obtained from 
the environment could give a wrong image (Jentoft et al., 2010, Song et al, 2013). The response 
(i.e enforcement, type of management, etc.) to the image perceived could not coincide with the 
real problems and opportunities.  
 
Due to their interdependence, this thesis uses a combined approach of governance attributes 
and characteristics of the RBA.  
 
2.1 Governance assessment: attributes and definition 
 
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) through collaboration with the Center of Oceans 
Solution (COS)1compiled what they call a “master list” of governance attributes and societal 
attributes that they identified as providers of good conservation outcomes. They used it for 
analysing the effect of governance on the sustainability and conservation goals in the Kane’ohe 
Bay, Hawai’i. The master list was obtained through the review of literature on institutional 
design and governance characteristics associated with sustainable common property resource 
management. A definition of each attribute is provided for further identification and analyse 
when undertaking the assessment of a governance system 
 
Table 1 summarizes the attributes identified by Battista (see Appendix B for reading the full 
table, which includes definition and explanation of the attributes) 
 
  
                                                 
1 Refered in the bibliography as Battista et al. (2016). 
Table 1: Master list's summary of effective governance attributes. 
Category Attribute 
Structural Attributes Regulatory Authority 
Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms 
Governance Goals Aligned with Conservation Objectives 
Science-Based Decision-making 
Agency Flexibility 
Explicit Recognition of Trade Offs 
Dependable Funding 
Participation 
Systematic Representation 
Deliberation 
Clear Decision-making Rules 
Clear Objectives and Directives 
Accountability and Transparency 
Appropriate Scale 
Social Justice and Empowerment 
Organizational Features Designed to Allow Transfer of 
Authority 
Societal Enabling 
Conditions 
Capacity for Self-Organization 
Capacity for Adaptation and Learning 
Pre-existing Local/ Traditional Organizations 
Social Support and Agreement 
Source: From "a Comprehensive Method for Assessing Marine Resource Governance: Case Study in Kãne'ohe 
Bay, Hawai'i"by W. Battista et al., 2016, Coastal management, 44, p. 
 
2.1.1 Evaluating governance: a scoring system 
  
Following the methodology of Battista et al. (2016), the governance attributes and societal 
attributes identified as providers of good conservation outcomes are evaluated by taking into 
account the elements of the definition that have being provide. Using the compiled definition 
for each item on the list as a standardized metric, the following scores are given (Table 2): 
 
Table 2: Governance Assessment Scoring System. 
Score Translation 
1 Low: Meets none of the qualities listed in attribute definitions. 
2 Medium: Meets some, but not all qualities listed in attribute definitions. 
3 High: Meets all of the qualities listed in attribute definitions. 
Source: From "a Comprehensive Method for Assessing Marine Resource Governance: Case 
Study in Kãne'ohe Bay, Hawai'i"by W. Battista et al., 2016, Coastal management, 44, p. 
 
The use of scores helps to the analysis, providing to the analyst the means for detecting if an 
element of the definition has been left aside. This scoring method can help to identify the 
weaknesses and strengths of the governance system that are helping or not to the fishery 
management goals.  
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2.2 Economic assessment: Characteristics of the right in the fishery and 
incentives  
 
2.2.1 Economic assessment: Characteristics of the right 
 
The type of fishing rights used is expected to affect to the fishers’ interest for sustainability and 
so to the individual fishing behaviour.  
At this regard, Scott (1989) defined several characteristics of the RBAs that have been used by 
several authors (Arnason, 2005, Le Gallic, 2006, Parkes, 2008) for evaluating the performance 
of RBAs. These characteristics, inherent to the economic concept of property right, have been 
linked mainly to economic performance, but also to biological recovery success.  
Scott (2000) considers the performance of the exploitation of natural resources as the result of 
the degree of property right that its owner has. This degree of property perceived will determine 
their behaviour, guided by their economic interests (Hannesson, 2005). As depicted by him 
(1989), the weakness or strength of the property right will depend on the degree of presence of 
several characteristics identified as Duration, Flexibility, Exclusivity, Quality/Security of Title, 
Transferability and Divisibility. 
However, Scott (1996, 2000) considered Flexibility and Divisibility as part of Transferability 
The characteristics can be defined as it follows (Scott, 2000):   
 
 Duration: Duration defines the period of ownership of the right. A property right can 
be own temporally (from hours to years) or be indefinitely. The degree of durability 
will define the objectives of the owner. A property right of short duration can stimulate 
the race for fish in order to maximise the profits. A property right of long duration can 
stimulate a sustainable behaviour of the owner and even the investment for reducing 
cost, increasing selectivity, increase catchability, etc. 
 Exclusivity: Exclusivity is the right to use and manage the resource without 
interference. In fisheries, exclusivity will be defined as the level of freedom of a fisher 
who owns the right for harvesting without intervention of government, managers or 
other fishers. There will never be full exclusivity since government will always regulate 
the fishery to a greater or lesser extent (Arnason 2005) Exclusivity regards clear and 
effective rules of access to the resource and the overlapping between rights(Le Gallic, 
2006). 
 Security of the title: Every right-holder faces some risk that their ownership may be 
challenged by someone else. The degree of security suggest the degree of protection 
that a possessor has against threats to his property rights. In words of Arnason (2005), 
the security of a RBM can be define as “the probability that the owner will be able to 
hold on to his property right.” 
 Transferability: Transferability refers to the possibility of the right of been transferred. 
Even if transferring the right is not allowed and no economic value is given to it, fishers 
will always find a way of giving economic value to the right and even sell it. The before 
commented Flexibility and Divisibility are usually include in transferability as intrinsic 
elements of the characteristic. Only if a right is transferable and related to a quantifiable 
sum, this sum could be divided for further selling or leasing. The more easily you can 
do it, the more flexible the ownership of the right is. 
 
2.2.2 Evaluating the fishing rights: a scoring system  
 
In order to analyse the degree of presence of the characteristics described above, the approach 
carried by the OCDE (Le Gallic, 2006) and by the European Commission (Parkes et al., 2009) 
is used. Some modifications have been applied regarding to exclusivity for adding rigor to the 
assessment. 
Using the definition of each of the Characteristics, scores from 1 to 5 have been given. Note 
that mostly all the characteristics will be present in the fishery at some extend, being the 
minimal score 1.  
 
Duration:  
 
Being the duration the period of ownership of the rights, it will measure giving intervals. The 
duration’s score will be given following the approach of the OECD.  
 
 One year or less (1) 
 2 to 5 years (2) 
 6 to 10 years (3) 
 10 years or more (4)  
 Perpetuity (5) 
 
Security: 
 
As explained by the OECD, for the right to be secure, first it has to be defined and legally 
enforceable. The more enforceable is, the less change is perceive and the better governance 
structures and interaction between actors in the fishery, the more certain will be the security of 
the right. Following this logic, the scores are stablished by the OECD as it follows: 
 
 Poor, if any, legal basis of rights; rights not enforceable (1) 
 Rights legally enforceable, but level of enforcement is low; compliance is low (2) 
 Rights legally enforceable, government retains right to adjust TAC and other technical 
measures (gear controls, etc.); co-management structures exist;  
some illegal fishing (3) 
 Rights legally enforceable, government retains right to adjust TAC only; co-
management structures are strong; little routine illegal fishing; enforcement is  
good (4) 
 Rights legally enforceable against the administration; no illegal fishing; good 
governance (5) 
 
Transferability: 
 
The degree of transferability will depend on the degree of divisibility and flexibility. The more 
flexible and divisible the right is, the higher the score (OECD): 
 
 Non-transferable (1) 
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 Transferable, but non-divisible; limits on transferability through significant ownership 
restriction (2) 
 Transferable, but non-divisible; some government control over transfer market; minor 
limits on ownership (3) 
 Transferable, divisible; some government control of transfer market (4) 
 Fully transferable and fully divisible; free transfer market (5) 
 
Exclusivity: 
 
Exclusivity is complicated to define, since the number of RBA is broad, and in many cases, the 
type of fishery management in place will affect to a same RBA, giving as result a different 
level of exclusivity. For scoring exclusivity, a flowchart has been developed and used 
(Appendix D). The following criteria are an example of how to score exclusivity: 
 
 no exclusivity (1): No RBA 
 low exclusivity (2): No TAC; individual licenses without any spatial boundary or 
harvest rules 
 Medium exclusivity (3): No TAC; individual licenses with informal spatial boundary 
or harvest rules 
 Medium high exclusivity (4): TAC; individual licenses with informal spatial boundary 
or harvest rules. We increase the score since the establishment of a TAC and the 
scientific advice related to it could help the fishing community in the establishment of 
fishing boundaries and catch sharings 
  High exclusivity (5): Territorial individual right; Individual Quota. 
 
The four economic characteristics of the fishing right are described and represented using a 
radar diagram (Figure 2). The features of the right will be indicated by the area enclosed, 
relative to theoretical/ideal property right (a right which scores highly on all four criteria). 
Although obtaining a prefect property right is impossible in practice, a property right which 
footprint will be close to the perfect right will theoretically provide better incentives sustainable 
behaviours and for economic efficiency. 
 
 
Figure 3: Radar diagram of property rights’ economic characteristics  
 
2.3 Combination of methodologies: Effect of Governance and RBA on the 
Striped venus fishery sustainability goals 
 
For the case study, the Battista scoring system has been applied for evaluating the governance 
attributes necessary for sustainable outcomes. 
 
The Scott approach and the combination with some modifications of the OECD, EU scoring 
system has been used, in order to studying the economic interests of fishers to behave 
sustainably.  
 
Although appearing to be a quantitative approach, this methodology is qualitative in nature, 
being the numeric values used only for interpretation purpose. More important that the 
numerical scores, is the identification of the incompleteness of the attribute which could be, 
alone or in addition with other ones, affecting negatively to the outcomes.  
 
The identification and evaluation of the relevant governance attributes and characteristics of 
the fishing rights have been possible through the thoroughly revision of the regulation 
additionally to literature review. For completing information about the resource, the fishers and 
the interaction between Cofradía and govern, key respondents for the evaluation and 
management of the resource have been interview (Appendix A). For knowing about the 
evaluation of the resource, the role of the cofradías in conservation activities the relation 
between those evaluating the resource and the cofradía, people from the IEO and AGAPA has 
been contacted. For knowing the role of government in the regulation of the chiral and the 
relation between government and cofradía, the JJAA and FACOPE have been contacted. The 
information about the cofradías and the relations between and within them, has been difficult 
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to gather. The delicate situation of the fishery since its closure on November 2016, additionally 
to the difficulty of contacting with the cofradías, has limited the possibilities of obtaining 
information from the fishing sector. However, it has been possible to contact with the cofradía 
of Sanlúcar de Barrameda and interviews have been carried with the technician of the cofradía, 
who is in charge of all the matters related with the negotiations with the JJAA and with other 
cofradías additionally of providing technical advice to the cofradía. In total, 5 interviews have 
been completed.  
 
2.4 Study Site 
 
2.4.1 Location of the fishery and ports participating in the use of the resource 
 
The clam fishery of the Striped venus (Chamelea gallina) is a fishery carried in the gulf of 
Cádiz, on the south-west coast of the Autonomous Region of Andalucía. The fishery is located 
in the Atlantic coast of Spain, defined area 27 of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and defined area IXa of by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), 
(Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Location of the Striped venus fishery, area IXa ICES. ICES spatial facility tool (http://gis.ices.dk/sf/) 
Following the study of Cortés (2016), the fleet targeting Striped venus is distributed between 
the ports of Ayamonte, Isla Cristina, Lepe, Punta Umbría and Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Figure 
5). However, mostly all the fleet targeting Striped venus is gathered in the ports of Isla Cristina, 
Punta Umbría and Sanlúcar de Barrameda.  
  
  
Figure 5: Gulf of Cádiz and ports. Google maps (https://www.google.it/maps/@37.0429065,-
7.0449885,77370m/data=!3m1!1e3)  
2.4.2 The Fishing Reserve of the Guadalquivir and the fishing activity 
 
Divided in four zones identified as zones A, B, C and D (Figure 6) the fishing reserve of the 
Guadalquivir has as main objective to protect fishing resources and to secure the spawning of 
a variety of species. Only artisanal fisheries are allowed to fish in the reserve.  
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Figure 6: Zones of the Fishery Reserve of the Guadalquivir (Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural 
de la J.A., 2017) 
 
The fishing activity inside the marine reserve and its zones will rely on the type of gear used. 
The Order of the 24th of June 2004 (BOJA No. 123, 24th June 2004) 2, modified through de 
Order of the 12th of July (BOJA No. 135, 12th July 2010) define the type of fishing activity that 
can be carried depending of the zone of the fishing reserve: 
 Zone A: The more restricted zone due to the high level of juveniles of different fish 
species. Only shellfishing on foot is allowed. 
 Zone B: Zone of nursery rich on plankton and key for the reproduction of the Striped 
venus. Only arts as gillnets and manual shellfishing are allowed. 
 Zone C: Zone where the fleet targeting Striped venus in the gulf of Cádiz can operate. 
The shellfishing activity is only allowed from September to February (both included) 
 Zone D: Zone where the fleet targeting Striped venus in the gulf of Cádiz can operate. 
The The shellfishing activity is only allowed from July to March (both included)  
 
Both zones C and D have as objective to reinforce the protection over the other two areas.
                                                 
2 All new law or precept will be included on the official gazette of the autonomous region, 
Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Andalucía (Official Andalusian Government Gazette - BOJA).   
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Chapter 3 Description of the fishery 
 
3.1 Target species, state of the resource, IUU fishing 
 
3.1.1 Target species 
 
Being of the order of the Veneroida and of the family of the Veneridae, the Chamelea Gallina 
(Linnaeus, 1758) (Figure 7) or Striped venus (Spanish common name) is described by FAO 
(2017) as a bivalve mollusc which inhabits bottoms of clean sand between 5 and 20 meters 
deep, and it feeds by ingesting a variety of algae, bacteria, and small detrital particles. 
 
It shell is solid, thick, equivalve and inequilateral, beaks in front of the midline, broadly 
triangular in outline with a round anterior margin but tending to be slightly drawn out 
posteriorly. Its colour goes from dirty white to cream or pale yellow, occasionally polished, 
usually with three red-brown rays. 
Its maximum length is 5 cm although the common length is between 2.5 and 3.5 cm.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Chamelea gallina (Linnaeus, 1758) (FAO, 2017) 
 
 Two spawns characterize the period of reproduction of the Striped venus:  
1) The main spawn period: May-June 
2) A less important spawning period: August-September 
Tending to attain the maturity at the second year of life, the Striped venus has an irregular 
growth. The periods of maximum growth are between August and November, decreasing it 
over the months of Decembers and January. In March, it starts growing again. (IEO, 2016). 
Since the recruitment will be on the end of the springtime and at the beginning of summer, it 
is normal that the fishing yield increases too during this season.     
The Striped venus is a quick growth short lived species which strongly relays on recruitment 
for maintaining the stock. Negative effects on recruitment (by environmental reasons or due to 
excessive pressure over the spawning stock biomass), will have negative effects over the 
abundance of the resource on the short run (IEO, 2011). 
 
3.1.2 History of the fishery 
 
García Ordaz (1999) amply described the short history of the Striped venus fishery. The fishery 
is characterized by many periods of increasing effort, overexploitation of the stocks and 
closures.  
The first significant increase of Striped venus’s landings started on 1956. However, the 
exponential increase of the fishing effort focused on the fishing of Striped venus did not happen 
until the period 1961-1968. This was favoured by the lack of control in the fishery, additionally 
to the closure and abandon of other fisheries because of the collapse of the fishing stocks (i.e. 
shrimp). This increase of the fishing effort can be reflected on the volumes of landings from 
1968, when the fishery reached the historical maximum of landings (30,000 Tonnes, Cortés, 
2016).  
Unfortunately, this exponential increase of the effort led the stock a serious state of 
overexploitation, resulting on an important decrease of the fishing stock during the period of 
1968 and 1974, provoking the shift of the Striped venus fishers onto other activities (gillnet, 
etc...). 
The worrying state of the fishing stock of Striped venus obliged the Spanish State to close the 
fishing zone of the Gulf of Cádiz during de period 1975-1976. The decrease of the landings 
and the closure of the fishery induced the Spanish markets to import Striped venus from Italy, 
which, once the fishing zone was reopened in 1977, made the fishers fish just when there were 
biological closures in Italy.  
This competition between the national and the Italian product induced a fleet renewal, which 
started on 1992 with the introduction of the mechanized dredge in the fishery. The new gear 
gave the possibility of competing against the foreign product and increased the profitability of 
the fishery. That and the possibility of fishing all the year (figure 8) (the fishers did not need to 
wait for the closures in Italy anymore), made the use of mechanized dredge general all over the 
fishery.  
 
 
Figure 8: Catch and effort before and after the introduction of the mechanized dredge. From García Ordaz, F. 
(1999). Análisis económico de la pesquería de Striped venus suratlántica. Revista de Estudios Regionales, (55), 
15-46. 
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Nevertheless, since the fishing capacity of the mechanized dredge is higher than the one of the 
manual dredge, the importance of the inputs control are even higher. In 2010, control measures 
seemed not to have been enough, and after several years of low harvest, the fishery had to close 
for 6 months. Previous measures seemed to work, with an increase of abundance and catch 
from 2012 to 2014, but a long period of closure in the end of 2014 provoked an increase of the 
fishing effort outside the limits imposed by the management in place. As a result, and after a 
bad recruitment during 2014, the poor abundance has obliged to close again the fishery at the 
beginning of 2016. 
 
3.1.3 Recent state of the resource 
 
The Instituto Español de Oceanografía (Spanish Institute of Oceanography - IEO), was asked 
by the Junta de Andalucía (Governmental body of the Autonomous Region of Andalucía - 
JJAA) to investigate the state of the resource due to the signs of overexploitation.  
 
The study lead by the IEO in 2016 has revealed that stock of Striped venus is overfished. The 
fishing yield of the fleet is similar to the one of the 2010, when the fishing zone was closed due 
to the dangerous status of the stock.  
The results were very significant. Through the study from 2008 to 2016 3 periods can be 
identified: 
 2008-2010, first period of overfishing. On 2010 a failure in the recruitment was detected 
due to the 2008’s floods in the gulf of Cádiz which increased the concentration of 
sediments in the bottom of the sea a did not allowed the Striped venus larvae to settle 
and grow.  
This failure on the recruitment additionally with the increase of the fishing effort and 
illegal and unreported catch (Silva, 2015) was traduced by a maximum fishing yield of 
nearly 2kg/min. and a minimum yield of 0.1 kg/min in 2010, which obliged to the JJAA 
to close the fishery temporally.  
 2011 to 2014, recuperation of the stock thanks to the control of the effort and the 
involvement of the fishers, a maximum fishing yield of 12.5 kg/min. is obtained. 
 From 2015 to 2016, were the fishing yield decrease highly due to a bad recruitment, the 
increase of the fishing effort (Alejandro Terrón Sigler, personal communication, March 
23, 2017) and the noncompliance of the management plan by the fishers, obtaining a 
fishing yield of 0.35 kg/min. on September 2016.  
The worrying state of the stock of Striped venus has led the Junta de Andalucía to close again 
the fishery from November 2016 until June 2017. 
 
3.1.4 Illegal fishing 
 
Following the IEO’s evaluation document of 2016, part of the situation of overexploitation of 
the stock is due to the noncompliance of the management plan of the Striped venus. 
It is not the first time that it happens. As said in the previous section (2.2.3), one of the causes 
of the closure in 2010 was the overfishing. The study leaded by the IEO (Silva Caparro, 2015) 
between December 2007 and December 2009 highlighted a gap between the reported catch in 
lonja and the real catch between May 2008 and May 2009.The real catch was estimated on 
5045 tonnes, while the reported catch was of 2917 tonnes. 
There is documented evidence of an increase of the violation of management rules (Parlamento 
de Andalucía, 2016; IEO, 2016) 
The high numbers of infractions, summed to the failure in the recruitment on 2014, have 
induced the fishery to a state of overexploitation. The most common infractions have been: 
i. High number of cases IEO cites 1000 cases in  where the vessel fish more than the 5 
hours stipulated by law. 
ii. Increase in the number of incursions on the zone B of the fishing reserve of the 
Guadalquivir, which is key as nursery area.  
iii. Detection of a high volume of immature Striped venus (under 25mm) on the all along 
the commercial net, being the quantity of Striped venus sold outside the lonja 
considerable. 
 
It has to be noted that, additionally to the already commented use as effort estimator, the GPS 
is also used for controlling that a vessel fishing in a closed season or in a forbidden area 
Moreover, since the selling is done through the cofradía expedition center, the control of sizes 
and traceability of the product can be easily obtained. 
 
3.1.5 Biological closures 
 
Molluscs’ fisheries are very vulnerable to the quality of the water since they feed filtering the 
surrounding water. The presence of toxic microalgae, bacteria or heavy metals will be a reason 
for managers to interrupt any fishing activity. Additionally, there is a closed season of two 
months of May and June for ensuring the spawning. At this regard, the fishery of the Striped 
venus can be closed by biological, chemical and weather causes all over the year, being in the 
end the average of the days of closure from 2010 to 2016 (Figure 9) of more than 100 days/year.  
 
 
Figure 9: Average closures by biological reason other than overexploitation fishing resource of the six production 
zones of Striped venus in the gulf of Cádiz (Data from Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural de la 
J.A.). 
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The high number of closures implies that, yearly and since 2010, at least one third of the fishing 
days the fishery has been closed. As already commented by the IEO in their report in 2016, the 
high number of closures can affect to the willingness of the fishers to comply and to co-manage 
the fishery, and mostly taking into account that during paralysation of the fishing activity, no 
subvention is granted (information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
 
3.2 Fishing fleet and employment 
 
3.2.1 Fishing fleet 
 
Since the introduction of the mechanized dredge in 1992, the number of mechanized dredges 
has increased. However, the number of vessels has been stable since the introduction of the 
census of vessels through the Order 23 of September of 2008 (BOJA No. 196, 1st October 
2008), where the number of vessels allowed catching molluscs and gastropods in Andalucía is 
registered. The census includes both mechanized dredge and manual dredge that can catch 
Striped venus, being their number of vessels in the fishery of the Striped venus on 2008 of 94 
mechanized dredges vessels and 34 manual dredge vessels. 
 
Since 2008, the number of mechanized dredges has been stable with the only incorporation of 
one vessel. The number of manual dredges has increased from 14 in 2008 to 31 in 2016 (Table 
3). 
 
Table 3: Number of vessels targeting Striped venus in the gulf of Cádiz. 
Source: Data from the Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural, embarcaciones marisqueras con arte 
de rastro y draga hidráulica con puerto base en el litoral del golfo de Cádiz (25/01/2017). 
 
However, the fleet of manual dredge not only focus in the Striped venus, but also in other 
molluscs, and can even change the gear.  
Port No. vessel Mechanized dredge Manual dredge 
AYAMONTE 7 2 5 
CHIPIONA 1 1 0 
HUELVA 2 1 1 
ISLA CRISTINA 52 37 15 
LEPE 8 7 1 
PUNTA UMBRIA 35 33 2 
SANLÚCAR DE BARRAMEDA 22 15 7 
TOTAL 127 96 31 
% TOTAL 100% 76% 24% 
Regarding to the characteristics of the fleet, and following the definition of artisanal fishery 
provided by the MAPAMA, the fleet can be considered artisanal since the average Gross 
Register Tonnage (GRT) is inferior to 20 GRT, their average length is inferior to 15 meters and 
they fish less than 24h a day (Cortés, 2016). The fishing capacity and power of the mechanized 
dredge is generally higher than the one of the manual dredge (Table 4). Additionally to its 
power, the fact that the number of mechanized dredges is three times superior plus the fact that 
the manual dredge can change the target species makes the impact of the mechanized dredge 
over the resource greater.  
 
Table 4: Characteristics of the vessels targeting Striped venus in the gulf of Cádiz. 
Port Mechanized dredge vessels Manual dredge vessels 
Average 
GRT 
Average 
Length 
overall 
Average 
power (kW) 
Average 
GRT 
average 
Length 
overall 
Average power 
(kW) 
AYAMONTE 9.92 13.04 69.50 3.03 8.12 33.83 
CHIPIONA 7.47 11.00 80.00 - - - 
HUELVA 13.41 13.57 121.00 3.35 7.49 24.00 
ISLA CRISTINA 12.14 13.30 103.65 2.93 8.27 28.69 
LEPE 14.32 14.72 161.29 2.79 7.49 30.00 
PUNTA 
UMBRÍA 
13.22 13.76 118.21 4.09 8.29 29.50 
SANLÚCAR DE 
BARRAMEDA 
11.42 13.12 112.19 3.02 7.03 41.71 
TOTAL 
AVERAGE 
12.48 13.51 111.97 3.05 7.91 32.57 
Source: From Cortés Rodríguez, C. (2016). La técnica multicriterio de programación por metas en la gestión de 
la pesquería de chirla (“Chamelea gallina”) de la región suratlántica Española. 
After consideration, the study, when analysing the Striped venus fishing fleet, will be focused 
on the mechanized dredge, since: 
 The manual dredge vessels fish other molluscs additionally to the Striped venus and 
studies about the fleet and its effect over the resource have not been obtained. 
 No specific regulation for controlling the fishing effort over the fishery of the Striped 
venus has been funded referring to the manual dredge. 
 The impact of the mechanized dredge over the Striped venus is higher than the impact 
of the manual dredge, because of their higher number and fishing capacity. 
 
3.2.2 Mechanized dredge 
 
Representing 76% of the Striped venus fishing fleet, the mechanized dredge (Figure 10) is by 
far the most used gear in the Striped venus fishery.  
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Figure 10: Mechanized dredge. (Huelva Información, 2016) 
 
The mechanized dredge can be described as a parallelepiped gear and its dimension will rely 
on the power and characteristics of the vessel, althought the average size is of 2.75 m. of length, 
2 m. of width and 0.45 of height3. The dredge includes hydraulic jets dredges that help to dig 
and to wash out the molluscs that have buried themselves in the seabed (FAO website). The 
mollusc, unburied, enters in the gear. Additionally, the gear is equipped with a sieving machine 
for selecting the Striped venus with a size of 25mm or superior (minimum size, see section 
2.5.2) 
  
There is two ways of proceeding when fishing (Figure 11). (1) After anchoring, 200-300 meters 
of cable are thrown (the cable is connected to the anchor) while getting away of the anchor. 
The mechanic dredge is thrown by the bow and, then, it digs while the vessel goes backwards 
while the crew withdraws the cable. The crew stop fishing once the vessel arrives to the point 
where the anchor is. The fishing is performed at 2.5 nautical nots (miles/hour) maximum and 
it will be repeat several time changing the course 5 degrees each time  
                                                 
3Information provided by the cofradía of Sanlúcar de Barrameda. Retrieved from 
http://cofradiapescadoresdesanlucar.com/flota/marisqueros/  
 
Figure 11: Fishing procedure. (chirlas, 2013) 
 
Referring to the selectivity of the mechanized dredge, nearly 71% of the species caught by the 
fleet of mechanized dredges in the gulf of Cádiz corresponds to the Chamelea gallina (Silvia 
& Juárez, 2013), being nearly 46% of it discarded because they size is under the legal size. The 
29% of the catch left is composed by 68% of other mollusc, 9.4% crustaceans, 0.5% fishes and 
22.1% of other species.  
All the bycatch is discarded, due to the regulation of the fishery of Striped venus, even if the 
species fished have commercial value. However, taking into account the elevate rate of 
discard’s survival of the catch with hydraulic dredge on the Alborán Sea (Gallardo-Roldán, 
2015), we could think that similar survival rates can be considered for this fishery. 
 
3.2.3 Employment 
 
With an average of 3 fishers by mechanized dredge, the Strip venus clam fishery provide 13% 
of the total employment in the port studied (table 5) 
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Table 5: Employment provided by the mechanized dredge fleet 
  Mechanized dredge Rest of the fleets % of the employment represented by the 
mechanized fleet 
AYAMONTE 6 345 2% 
ISLA CRISTINA 111 824 13% 
PUNTA UMBRIA 99 428 23% 
SANLUCAR DE 
BARRAMEDA 
45 423 11% 
LEPE 21 168 13% 
TOTAL 282 2,188 13% 
Source : Data from Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural de la J.A. (2017) 
 
3.3 Fishery legislation 
 
3.3.1 Spanish legislation 
 
As part of the European Union (EU), the Spanish Government regulates the fishing resources 
under the umbrella of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the EU. The MAPAMA is 
ministry in charge of creating basic fishing legislation framework of the country. 
 
In this context, the Ley 3/2001 del 26 de Marzo de Pesca Maritima del Estado (State Marine 
Fisheries Law 3/2001 of the 26th of March - LDPMDE), sets the basic legislation on fisheries 
of Spain, contemplating the law the following issues:  
 
I) Maritime Fisheries on external waters  
II) Management of the fishing sector 
III) Commercialization and transformation of fishing products 
IV) Fishing investigation and oceanography 
V) Infractions and sanctions  
VI) Regulation of the fishing vessels on the Fishing Vessels’ Census 
However, since the approval of the Spanish Constitution on 1978 (article 148/11), the Spanish 
State recognises the right of legislate and execute of the Autonomous regions in their internal 
waters as an exclusive competence, in order to manage their fisheries. 
 
3.3.2 Autonomous Region Legislation 
 
With the approval of the Spanish Constitution on 1978 and under the Statutes of Autonomy 
approved the following years, the exclusive control and management of the coastal zones and 
any activity developed until 12 nautical miles is carried by the different Autonomous Regions 
of Spain (article 149.1.19 of the Spanish Constitution).  
In the case of the Autonomous Region of Andalucía, the Statute of Autonomy was approved 
the 30th December 1981, with a last modification on with the Organic law 2/2007 of the 19th of 
March the Statute of Autonomy of Andalucía specifies in its 48th article regarding to fisheries: 
i. Exclusive competence over every maritime fishery, shellfishery, aquaculture, artisanal 
fishing, professional diving and titles for recreational activities on its internal waters. 
ii. Management of the fishing sector, specifically over the professional conditions for the 
execution of the fishing activity, construction, security and registration of vessels, 
hiring lonjas, promotion and social protection of the fishers and others working in the 
fishing sector. Investigation, innovation, development, technologic transference and 
fishing formation. 
iii. Vigilance, inspection and control of the competences regulated on the previous articles. 
iv. The Autonomous Region share competences also in the planning of the fishing sector 
and fishing harbours.  
 
The Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Rural Development - CAPDR) of the JJAA is the governing body in charge of elaborating 
the fishing legislation in the autonomous region. The Law 1/2002 of the 4th of April 2002 
(BOJA No 45, 18th April 2002) establish the legal framework of the fishing activity and 
aquaculture of the Autonomous Region based on the The State Marine Fisheries Law 3/2001. 
The law regulates the following themes: 
 
I) General Provisions 
II) Rational use of the resource in interior waters 
III) Professional marine fishing on interior waters and shellfishing  
IV) Recreational fishing on interior waters 
V) Improvement and adaptation of the fishing fleet 
VI) Structure of the fishing sector 
VII) Regulation and promotion of marine aquaculture 
VIII) Commercialization of fishing products 
IX) Investigation, technological development and training on fishing and aquaculture 
activities 
X) Monitoring and inspection 
XI) Infractions and penalties 
 
3.4 Management of the Striped venus fishery 
 
Under the framework of the Law 1/2002, the Autonomous Region of Andalucía has been 
adapting the management of the fishery to the status of the sock., establishing different 
measures for limiting the effort in the Striped venus fishery with input controls, technical 
measures, monitoring and enforcement, and also output controls (diary catch limits per vessel 
until 2011).  We have to point out that even if two types of fishing fleets fish Striped venus in 
the gulf of Cádiz, the mechanized dredge fleet is the one has an specific management plan. The 
manual dredge has to be included in the same census of the mechanized dredge, it the 
characteristics of the gear are regulated and, they have to respect the minimum size of the chiral 
and the closures. However the manual dredge can target other species and are not submitted as 
strictly to any effort limitation since, even if they the same schedule of activity (exit and 
entrance into the port, hour of start and hour of end of the fishing activity), the manual dredge 
vessels do not have a maximum number of fishing hours.  
That said, the management of the fishery until 2016 has being following the management plan 
from 2011. The management plan, based on the Order of the 24th of June 2011 (BOJA No. 128, 
1st July 2011), modified through de Order of the 26th of July (BOJA No. 149, 1st August 2011), 
29 
 
had as objective to regulate the fishing effort of the fleet of mechanized dredge operating in the 
fishery of the gulf of Cádiz which ensure the responsible used of the fishing resources and the 
improvement of the fishing fleet for adapting to the fishing resource available. Since 2011, the 
JJAA has been adapting the management of the fishery to the status of the sock. Although it 
seems that it hasn’t been enough. The management plan in the fishery until the closure on 
November 2016 included the following measures. 
 
3.4.1 Input controls: 
 
Fishing licenses and census 
 
The main way of controlling effort in the fishery of the Autonomous region of Andalucía is by 
using fishing licenses and closing the vessel census so no more vessels can access to the fishery. 
At this regard, The Decree 387/2010 (BOJA No. 214, 3rd November 2010), modified through 
the Decree 99/2015 (BOJA No.44, 5th March 2015) establish that for gathering shellfish from 
a vessel is necessary the specific license for shellfishing from a vessel. 
The Order of the 24th of June 2011, modified through de Order of the 26th of July establish that 
only mechanized dredges that have the license for gathering shellfish and are included on the 
list of mechanized dredges of the Junta de Andalucía’s shellfishing activity census, (created on 
2008). Additionally, new vessels could only integrate the fishery in case that it substitutes an 
older one which realized the same activity. New vessels will have at maximum the same GTs 
and Kw. However, even if the census is theoretically closed, the number of mechanized dredge 
has increased from 93 in 2008 to 96 in 2016. 
 
Limitation of the fishing effort 
 
In order to limit the pressure over the fishing stock, the JJAA through the Order of the 24th of 
June, modified through the order of the 26th of July, establish that the mechanized dredge 
vessels could fish a maximum of 5 hours per day. 
 
3.4.2 Technical measures 
 
Regulation of the fishing activity 
 
The legislation contemplates technical measures regarding times restriction. The Decree 
387/2010, modified through the Decree 99/2015 establishes that fishers can only perform their 
fishing activity from Monday to Friday, being forbidden to fish on weekends and holidays. The 
Order of the 13th of June of 2013 (BOJA No. 119, 20th June 2013) regulates the journeys and 
schedules of the shellfishing and fishing activity of the gulf of Cadiz. Regarding to the 
gathering of Striped venus it establish that the hour of exit from the port will start at 5:00 am. 
Vessels should be at port at 4:00 pm.  
Zones restriction is also contemplated through the Order of the 24th of June 2011, modified 
through de order of the 26th of July, were the Autonomous Region dictates that mechanized 
dredges can only access to the zones where there is Striped venus, and they are only authorized 
to fish Striped venus.  
The minimum sizes of the catches and closed seasons4 for the bivalve molluscs and 
gastropods of the Autonomous Regions of Andalucía are regulated through the Order of the 
25th of March of 2003 (BOJA, No. 65,4th April 2003). The Order establishes the minimum 
sizes of the catches and closed seasons for the bivalve molluscs and gastropods of the 
Autonomous Regions of Andalucía. The Striped venus minimum size is 25mm and it closed 
season will start from the 1st May to the 30th of June. 
 
Monitoring and enforcement 
 
The JJAA putted in place their own satellite based system called Sistema de Localización y 
Seguimiento de Embarcaciones Pesqueras Andaluzas (Localization and Monitoring System of 
Andalusian Fishing Vessel - SLSEPA). Colloquially known as “Caja Verde” (Green Box) 
(Figure 12), this device gives the ID of the vessel, position, direction speed, hour and data. As 
mentioned by Order of the 24th of June 2011, modified through de Order of the 26th of July, 
the Green Box has to be installed in all the artisanal vessels. It use is key for assuring 
compliance can control that a vessel is not fishing more than allowed or that it does not enter 
on any of the forbidden zones. Furthermore, its use allows the gathering of useful data as could 
be the fishing effort for estimating the Catch per Unit Effort (CPUE) 
 
 
Figure 12: "Green Box" lighthouse style. (Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural de la J.A, 2017) 
 
Regarding to enforcement, the Autonomous Region of Andalucía contemplate several 
enforcement measures that the owner of the license and the vessel do not follow the order, he 
                                                 
4 The closures of 2010 and 2016 have been also included on the BOJA. The orders referring to 
the closures has been: 
 
Orden of the 16th of December of 2010 (BOJA No. 245 17th December 2010), which 
determined the complete closure of the fishery from the next day after the publication of the 
BOJA until the 15th July 2011. 
Orden of the 30th of November of 2016 (BOJA No. 232, 2nd  December 2016), which 
determined the complete closure of the fishery from the next day after the publication of the 
BOJA until the 30th June 2017. 
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can face the temporal immobilization of the vessels or the suspension, withdrawal and 
impossibility of renewal of the license for a maximum period of 5 years (according to the Law 
2002/1).  
 
Additionally, the landings are regularly inspected by the by the JJAA, in order to have in mind 
that there are not irregularities.  
 
3.4.3 Negotiation and new regulations 1st July 2017 
 
After de closure in November 2016 multiple negotiations have been carried between the sector 
of the Striped venus and the JJAA, and with the assessment of the IEO (figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13: Negotiations for the new management plan between cofradías and JJAA (information obtained through 
personal interview, 2017) 
 
Through the Order of the 29th of June 2017 (BOJA No. 124, 30th June 2017) it has been written 
a full management plan, including all the elements of previous orders and decrees and, 
additionally, actualizing previous articles and including new ones. While the first management 
plans in 2011 had as objective to control and reduce the fishing effort, this new management 
plan has as main objective to ensure Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by regulating the 
fishing activity (Table 6).  
The most important measures that have been included by the order 29 of June 2017 have been 
the inclusion of output controls for the first time since the suppression of the 200kg/day vessel 
catch limit on 2011 (Cortés, 2016) since the catch limit was not efficient (IEO, 2016) for 
controlling the fishing effort. 
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Table 6: New regulations of the management plan of the Striped venus fishery June 2017. 
 
 
Input control Output control Technical measures Enforcement  
 Additionally to the 
previous licenses, the 
owner of the vessel 
has to have an 
authorization from the 
Government of 
Andalucía for the use 
of the mechanic 
dredge. 
 Maximum Fishing 
Hours allowed have 
been reduced from 5 
hours to 3 hours. 
 The cofradías and Ship-owners 
associations could establish a 
maximum quantity of 
commercialization and first selling 
of the product in the three lonjas of 
the ports authorised. 
 Establishment of biological limits: 
o A catch limit of 2,500t/year 
o Minimum average CPUE of 
0.8kg/minute 
 Once the 90% of the catch limit has 
been reached, the JJAA can close 
preventively the fishery for analysis 
the state of the resource. 
 If the 0.8kg/minute are not reached, 
the JJAA will evaluate the fishery 
and it will close it in case of not 
being enough. 
 If the CPUE is equal to 0.6kg/minute 
or inferior, the fishery will be closed 
automatically. 
 Suppression of the characteristics 
of the sieving machine 
 Definition of forbidden zones: 
o Zones closed by sanitary 
reasons.  
o Zones closed by biological  
o Zones closer than 0.25 miles 
to the baseline. 
o Zones A and B of the Marine 
Reserve of the Guadalquivir 
o Any zone where the activity 
is not allowed 
 The landings should be carried in 
the ports of Isla Cristina, Punta 
Umbria and Bonanza. The selling 
should be carried in those ports. 
 Inclusion of reasons of revocation of the 
new authorizations for the use of 
mechanic dredge: 
o Non-compliance of the 
characteristics that the gear should 
have 
o Fishing during a non-authorised 
fishing day 
o Fish more time than allowed 
o Fishing activity in forbidden zones 
o  For navigating in the forbidden zone 
less than 6 knots (or nautical miles) 
o Fishing activity while the fishery is 
closed 
 Process of retreat of the authorization 
will start after a minimum of three 
incompliance cases 
 Additionally to the sanctions of 5 years, 
subventions and public helps can be 
denied for 2 years and the licence for 
fishing can be retired for 4 months 
Source: Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Andalucía No. 124, 30th June 2017.  
3.5 Stakeholders 
 
3.5.1 Fishers’ cofradías 
 
Historical role: 
 
The cofradías (Spanish fishers’ guilds), since the 1978 and as defined by LDPMDE as non-profit 
corporations of public right, who act as consultation organs which collaborate with the 
Autonomous Regions in order to ordinate the fishing sector. 
However, the role of the cofradías in coastal fishery management in Spain has been notable since 
centuries, although at different degrees (Franquesa, 2004, Barrios, 1998). With documented data 
of their presence in Spain since the XII century and with the condition of religious guilds, the 
kingdom of Spain granted to the different Spanish cofradías the access to the resource on a 
territorial basis. This system worked until The XIX century, when the political changes in Spain, 
stimulated by the French revolution, weakened the power of the King and the Church. As 
religious guild, the cofradías where abolished, but they did not disappear. The cofradías changed 
their institutional appearance from religious guild to different institutions as industrial 
associations, cooperatives, owners associations, workers societies, etc. It was not until after the 
Spanish civil war and the instauration of the Authoritarian Government, that the cofradías were 
reinstituted as a fishers’ organization of corporative nature and institutionalized that aimed to 
control the resource. The aspects of community-based resource management and the co-
management structure are conserved until today. 
 
Cofradías in Andalucía nowadays and the Striped venus fishery: 
 
The cofradías and its configuration are regulated by the Autonomous Regions since 1992 (Ley 
Orgánica 9/1992, de 23 de diciembre, de transferencia de competencias a Comunidades 
Autónomas) and as already mentioned, the cofradías have a consultant role and collaborates with 
the administration in the management of the fishery. The autonomous region of Andalucía 
recognise the consultant role of the cofradías in the Article 41 of the Law 1/2002, being also 
indicated the duties that can be assigned or are assigned to the cofradías by the public 
administration. Those duties, mostly related to the artisanal sector, refer to the fishing activity 
and commercialization of the catch. Their duties are the following ones: 
 
i. Act as consultative organ of the public administration on the elaboration and application 
of rules that can affect the fishing sector. 
ii. Act as consultative organ of the public administration in the elaboration of studies and 
reports when the public administration asks to. 
iii. Present to the public administration proposals in order to improve the fishing sector (or 
fishery in particular), particularly those proposals that pursue to improve the technical, 
economic and social conditions of the fishing activity, especially in the artisanal sector. 
iv. Act as collaborative organ of the public administration referring to the fishing activity and 
commercialization of the catch. 
v. Promote formation activities related with fisheries for the professionals of the sector 
vi. Act as public offices for the reception, the registration and processing of the 
documentation directed to the CAPDR 
vii. Represent and defend the economic and corporative interests of their members. 
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The structure and the operation of the cofradías is regulated by the Decree 84/2004 of the 2nd of 
March (BOJA No. 52, 16th March 2004), and broaden and developed by the Order of the 26th  of 
February (BOJA No. 6, 11th January 2005). The Order establish the basic principles that should 
govern the creation, constitution and the operation of the cofradías, being this principles based 
on: (1) Democratic structure, (2) Members’ participation, (3) equal representation between fishers 
and vessel owners, (4) freedom of membership, (5) submission to the CAPDR tutelage, (6) 
Economic Management autonomy,  (7) Interest Management of its members.  
 
The Order of the 26th of February also determines the management structure of the cofradías. The 
structure should be the following one: 
 
Junta general: integrated by the same amount of fishers and ship owners representing the 
different fleets integrating the cofradía, the Junta general is the superior management organ of it. 
Also, the Junta decides all the important matters related to the cofradía’s budgets, self-imposed 
fishery management measures, control of the fishing activity, additionally to other duties that can 
be present on their statutes. The leader elected of the cofradía is the “Patrón Mayor” which could 
be a fishers or a ship-owner, and the Junta general elects him. His role is to be the representative 
of the cofradía. The “Vicepatrón Mayor” will be also elected by the Junta and will substitute the 
Patrón Mayor in case of need. 
 
Cabildo: Integrated also by the same amount of fishers and ship owners representing the different 
sectors of the cofradía, being it role to administrate the ordinary matters of it. 
 
It has to be noted that although the membership in the cofradía is voluntary, the selling of the 
catch can only be performed through the lonja (for fish) or an expedition centre (for molluscs), 
buildings owned by the cofradía for the first sale of the landings. This obliges the fishers to be 
inscribed in the cofradía. Nevertheless, the fact that the catch can only be sold through the lonjas 
or expeditions centres ensures the recollection of data plus the control and traceability of the 
landings.  
 
Some cofradías do not have lonjas or expedition centres since they don´t have enough volume of 
fish or enough funds for making it work. Other ports don´t even have a cofradía, as for example 
Lepe. However, agreements can be reached between cofradías and vessel owners for them to sell 
in other cofradías´ markets. 
 
The Order of the 23rd of June of 2007 (BOJA No. 22, 30th January 2007) establishes that the only 
cofradías that can sell Striped venus are the cofradías of Isla Cristina, Sanlúcar de Barrameda and 
Punta Umbria. The vessels of the ports of Lepe and Ayamonte can and have to sell its products 
in the rest of cofradías. By proximity we suppose that the vessels of Ayamonte sell in Isla Cristina 
and the vessels of Lepe sell in Punta Umbría. 
 
Federación Andaluza de Cofradías de Pescadores 
 
The cofradía system is articulated so the individual cofradías could be a properly and efficiently 
represented when negotiating with Autonomous Regions and the Spanish Government. Each 
cofradía will integrate a provincial federation, a regional federation, and the National Federation 
(Federación Nacional de Cofradías de Pescadores - FNCP) (Figure 14). 
In Andalucía, the Decree 84/2004 and Order of the 26th of February also contemplate the role of 
the Federación Andaluza de Cofradías de Pescadores (Andalusian Federation of Fishers’ Guilds 
- FACOPE). The FACOPE has as function to represent the cofradías and to manage and 
coordinate the common interest of this ones. The FACOPE will have also a Junta general which 
will be integrated by the Patrón mayor and Vicepatrón mayor of the cofradías of the Federación 
Provincial (Provincial Federation), representative organ which groups individual cofradías from 
the same province.  
 
 
Figure 14: Representation system of the cofradías (local, provincial, regional and national) 
 
3.5.2 Other stakeholders 
 
Ship-owners associations 
 
The ship-owner association are companies’ associations legally recognized by the JJAA, being 
defined by the article 38 of the Law 1/2002 and its functions included in the article 39. Only 
composed by vessel owners, has as objective to defend the interest of the vessels owners that are 
affiliated to the association. Its duties, related to the fishing activity will be will to: 
 
 Participate in the management of the fishery in order to secure the rational and responsible 
use of the fishing resource, collaborating with the JJAA in the elaboration of management 
plans and the following of its execution. 
 
In the Striped venus fishery the following vessel owners association intervene in the management: 
 
National Federation 
of Cofradías
Regional Federation 
of Cofradías
Provincial 
Federation  Of 
Cofradías
Individual Cofradía 
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 Isla Cristina, 
o Asociación Armadores Asoisamar 
o Asociación Armadores Asodraga  
 Asociación de armadores Punta Umbria 
 Asociación de armadores Ayamonte 
 Asociación de armadores Lepe 
 
The only port that don´t have a vessels owners association is the port of Sanlúcar de Barrameda, 
since they consider that the cofradía represent efficiently the interest of the vessels owners 
(information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
 
Governmental Organizations 
 
IEO: 
 
The IEO is a Spanish public research organization focused on marine science investigation. Its 
main purpose, cited by the Royal Decree 1950/2000 of the 1st of December 2000 (BOE No. 289, 
2nd December 2000)5, modified through the Royal Decree 718/2010 of the 28th of May (BOE No. 
139, 8th June) is the technological research and development and the transfer of knowledge about 
the sea and its resources. Additionally, as contemplated by the Law 14/2011 of the 1st of June 
2011 (BOE No. 131, 02nd June 2011) it has as role to assess to the, State or Autonomous Region 
which requires oceanographic and marine science assessment. There are nine oceanographic 
centres in Spain, being the IEO of Cádiz one in charge of the evaluation of the resources of the 
gulf of Cádiz. The IEO, under agreement with CAPDR, evaluated the fishery for the first time in 
2008-2009 (IEO, 2016), being the scientific assessment body of the JJAA. Since then the IEO 
has been doing samplings each 15 days (information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
The IEO elaborates the reports referring to the state of the fishery when the JJAA ask it, being 
the first one in 210. The last study carried by the IEO has been on 2016 being the study that 
confirm the dangerous situation of the stock. 
 
AGAPA: 
 
The Agencia de Gestión Agraria y Pesquera de Andalucía (Agrarian and Fishery Management 
Agency of Andalusia - AGAPA) as an agency of special regime (articulo 54.2.c)) which, as part 
of the JJAA, has as objective to support and assess to the JJAA referring to the Agriculture and 
Fishery Sector. AGAPA would be in charge of communicating to the JJAA if something 
threatening the fishing resource, and they will assess on the elaboration of measures for facing 
the situation. As specific labour, AGAPA is in charge of the monitoring the fishing activity of 
the artisanal fleet through the SLSEPA. Also, AGAPA is will carry inspection of the fishing 
activity of the artisanal fleet on the field, incrementing the number of inspections ,for example, 
when the biological closure of the Striped venus or other molluscs are in place. They may do the 
samplings for analysing the state of the resource regularly (information obtained through personal 
interview, 2017). 
                                                 
5 All new law or precept will be included on the official gazette of Spanish State, Boletín Oficial del Estado (Official 
State Gazette - BOJA 
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Chapter 4 Results 
 
In this chapter we expose (1) the results of the governance assessment of the coastal governance 
(2) and the property rights´ economic assessment of the fishing rights present in the Striped venus 
fishery. 
 
4.1 Governance assessment 
 
4.1.1 Structural Governance Attributes 
 
Regulatory Authority 
 
The Autonomous Region of Andalucía, as granted by the Spanish Constitution and the Statute of 
Autonomy of Andalucía, has exclusive competence over maritime fishery, shellfishery, 
aquaculture, artisanal fishing, professional diving and titles for recreational activities in its 
internal waters. The CAPDR as part of the JJAA is the governing body in charge of elaborating 
the fishing legislation in the autonomous region. As part of its jurisdiction, the CAPDR regulates 
the fishery of the Striped venus in the gulf of Cádiz. Through the IEO and the AGAPA, the 
CAPDR receives information about the state of the stock additionally to the behaviour of the fleet 
so they can modify the regulation in accord with the circumstances.  
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
The CAPDR has the power to impose penalties in accord with the Law 30/1992, 26 of November 
(Ley 30/1992, de 26 de Noviembre de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del 
Procedimiento Administrativo Común, y el Reglamento del Procedimiento para el ejercicio de la 
potestad sancionadora), approved by the Royal Decree 1398/1993, 4th of August. The JJAA 
elaborates an annual plan with specific objectives of monitoring and enforcement for each fishery. 
AGAPA will execute the monitoring and enforcement plan by controlling the fleet through the 
SLSEPA system detecting acts of non-compliance such of fishing activity in the fishing reserve 
or more fishing hours that allowed (public security corpses of the state in charge of the protection 
of the nature). AGAPA will also program inspection of the expedition centres for checking that 
molluscs without the proper characteristics are sold. In case of detecting an infringement of the 
regulation, it could be identified as: minor infringement, serious infringement and very serious 
infringement. The type of penalties that CAPDR will impose will depend of the type of 
infringement, going from warnings and fines, to suspension of the fishing license or 
decommission of the gear and vessel. The way that the CAPDR decides what penalty to impose 
will depend on the effect of the illegal activity on the resource, the existence of intentionality, the 
recurrence, and the profit obtained when committing the infringement. However, it seems that 
the permissiveness in the fishery makes the enforcement weak. The last closure of 2016 has been 
provoked by the non-compliance of the management plan in place. Not all the fleet is involved, 
but a small percentage of the fleet is well known by its illegal activity, and even if the CAPDR 
knows it, it does not paralyze the vessels or increases the hardness of the penalties (information 
obtained through personal interview, 2017). Problems have been detected with the monitoring 
system, which has not been working well since 2014. Fishers realized that the JJAA was not able 
of repairing the Green Boxes that were not working because a lack of budget. They started 
breaking the Green Boxes and they increased their illegal activities. In fact, it is known that some 
vessels have been fishing while the fishery has been closed in 2016 (information obtained through 
personal interview, 2017). Some fishers even use small boats where they transfer part of the 
Striped venus caught (information obtained through personal interview, 2017) 
 
SCORE: 1 
 
 
Governance Goals Aligned with Conservation Objectives 
 
The management plan of the Striped venus established on 2011 by Order of the 24th of June 2011 
specifies that the objective of the management plan is to regulate the fishing effort of the fleet of 
mechanized dredge operating in the fishery of the Gulf of Cádiz for ensuring a responsible use of 
the fishing resources and the improvement of the fishing fleet for adapting to the fishing resource 
available. The objective is in line with the Council Regulation (CE) No. 2371/2002, 20th of 
December 2002, for granting the use of the fishing resource in order to achieve sustainable 
economic, biological and social condition. Additionally the management plan contemplates a 
fishing ban in the Zones of the fishing reserve of the Guadalquivir identified as nursery zones of 
different species which can be threatened by the fishing activity of the fleet targeting Striped 
venus. 
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
Science-Based Decision-making 
 
The IEO, under agreement with CAPDR, has been evaluating the fishery since 2008-2009, 
samplings each 7-15 days and providing scientific assessment to the CAPDR (information 
obtained through personal interview, 2017). An annual report of the fishery is sent to the CAPDR, 
elaborating additional reports when the CAPDR request it. In fact, the CAPDR asked to the IEO 
in 2010 and 2016 to elaborate a report about the state of the stock, being the reports the basis for 
new regulations in order to solve a situation of overexploitation. 
Additionally, AGAPA provide scientific support by having periodically on-board observers that 
take data for its further use on the estimation of the MSY, recruitment, discards identification the 
zones where the effort is concentrated and the estimation of the CPUE through the SLSPA and 
landing data (information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that the collaboration of the cofradías with the CAPDR in the management 
is quite limited. New ideas are not normally proposed, and when they are, they are not usually 
supported by other cofradías or within the cofradía itself, being difficult to achieve a consensus 
between them. As an example, the cofradía of Sanlúcar de Barrameda is the only one that has 
proposed a specific management plan with a proposal of distribution of the TAC established in 
the new regulation of 2017. However, none of the other cofradías have approved it yet. In fact, 
the cofradía of Sanlúcar de Barrameda is the only cofradía that has hired someone with scientific 
background for assessing the fleet of the cofradía and representing their interests in case of need 
(information obtained through personal interview, 2017).  
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Even though, there is some agreement in the need of the scientific knowledge for the 
sustainability of the fishery and the attitude of the fishers seems to have changed at this regard 
during the last 10-12 years. Ten years ago, the fishers did not allow scientists of the IEO and 
AGAPA to use their vessels for sampling. They started acceding just if the CAPDR paid for them 
to let the scientist to go on board of their vessels. Now, they do it for free (information obtained 
through personal interview, 2017) (although, not all the fishers).  
 
SCORE: 2 
 
 
Agency Flexibility 
 
There is flexibility regarding to the management responsibilities that can be assigned to the 
cofradías. In fact, the CAPDR is negotiating with the FACOPE for creating a new regulation of 
the Cofradías and its Federations for increasing the role of the cofradías in the fishery 
management and commercialization information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
However, right now is unlikely that governance structure of the Striped venus fishery is going to 
change. The cofradías could have more administrative responsibilities as for example managing 
the depurations centres, following the state of the resource and help with the stock assessment 
and to monitor and enforce the landings and their commercialization. Nevertheless, as said above, 
only Sanlúcar de Barrameda has someone hired with scientific background, and the sector by 
itself seems not to participate actively in the in management.  
 
SCORE: 2 
 
 
Explicit Recognition of Trade Offs 
 
The main objective of the CAPDR is to obtain the sustainability of the resource, and it is the 
priority. No formalized mechanism has been identified for making choices when a conflict of 
goals is present in the fishery. 
 
SCORE: 1 
 
 
Dependable Funding 
 
The assessment and management of the fishery is carried by the public administration through 
public funds. However, the crisis in Spain has provided some problems of funding for the 
Autonomous Regions, and this could have been reflected in the management, as it has happened 
with the repairing of the Green Box (information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
The cofradías are self-sufficient since each member pay a quota for maintaining the functioning 
of the cofradía. Regarding to economic aids for conservation services, economic incentives have 
been provided to the fishers for helping in the sampling activities by lending their vessels. 
Nowadays they are not paid and they do it for free. 
 
SCORE: 2 
 
 Participation 
 
The cofradías, which include all the stakeholders involved directly with the fishing activity, have 
a consultant role (recognised by law) and collaborates with the administration in the elaboration 
of the fishery management regulation. Depending on the situation of the fishery, the number of 
meetings between cofradías and CAPDR will vary. There are periods when the cofradías meet 
the CAPDR several times during the year and others when they haven’t done meetings in more 
than six months (information obtained through personal interview, 2017). The opinion of the 
cofradías is always taken into account (if the CAPDR consider it reasonable) and the participation 
could be by meetings, workshops and monitoring commissions of fishing areas (information 
obtained through personal interview, 2017). For example, during the elaboration of the new 
management plan in 2017, 14 of 17 proposals of the fishers have been included in the new 
regulation. It is generally agreed that relation between CAPDR and cofradías is good (information 
obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
Systematic Representation 
 
The relevant stakeholders, fishers and vessel owners, are both present in the negotiation. 
Fishermen are represented by the cofradía, and vessel owners are represented by cofradías and 
vessel owners both. The two groups are identified by the legislations and they take part of the 
negotiations. They all have voice at the negotiation. Additionally, the fishing sector of the Striped 
venus has always someone who´s more involved and act as leader of the sector within the 
cofradía. (information obtained through personal interview, 2017).  
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
Deliberation  
 
There is a formal process for negotiation and discussion between cofradías and Spanish 
institutions. Formally, the cofradías of Isla Cristina, Punta Umbria and Sanlúcar de Barrameda 
and Ayamonte discuss between them before presenting their needs/demands/suggestions through 
FACOPE, which should represent the interest of the cofradías as if they were just one institution 
(information obtained through personal interview, 2017).The FACOPE has the support of a 
representative of each cofradía, being normally one of it the Patrón Mayor and the leader of the 
Striped venus fleet in the cofradía. The sector has the right to expose it opinion, although the 
CAPDR will have the last word. The IEO will mediate and assess regarding to the measures used. 
Informally, the role of FACOPE has been lately diminished. For example, in case of the 
negotiation of 2016, FACOPE, even if present, did not intervene (information obtained through 
personal interview, 2017). Its representative role reduced, the fishery is losing the possibility of 
having a single and strong voice.  
 
SCORE: 2 
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Clear Decision-making Rules 
 
Decision making rules and outcomes are estimated through modelling by the IEO so there is no 
ambiguity when proceeding and elaborating the new regulation (information obtained through 
personal interview, 2017) 
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
Clear Objectives and Directives 
 
As already said the CAPDR established the objective of the fishery in the regulation of 2011, 
which said that the objective of the regulation is to grant the use of the fishing resource in order 
to achieve the sustainable economic, biological and social condition of the fishery.  
 
The Order of 2011 included in its article 18, that for achieving the sustainable use of the resource, 
a reduction of the fishing capacity of the fleet had to be carried, being the 30th of June 2013 the 
limit for doing it. The objectives and task for attaining this reduction were: 
 To reduce the total fishing capacity (measured in GRT and kW) of the mechanized dredge 
fleet at least 8%. 
 The reduction of the fishing capacity will be carried by the reduction of the fleet. 
 
The report of the Spanish State about the situation of the fleet in 20136 shows that by 2013 the 
capacity of the fleet was reduced although it calculates it taking to account the whole fleet without 
separating mechanized dredge and manual dredge. The IEO, however, estimated that no more 
reduction of the fishing capacity had to be carried. 
 
Yet, no more control of the fishing capacity has been carried until 2016, having the fleet of 
mechanized dredge increased their total GRT by 4% and the total kW by 39% (Appendix E). 
 
SCORE: 2 
 
 
Accountability and Transparency 
 
The CAPDR is expected to justify actions or decisions if needed; in the Parlamento de Andalucía 
(article 106.3 of the Statute of Autonomy of the Autonomous Region of Andalucía) as it happened 
with the closure of the fishery in 2016 (Parlamento de Andalucía, 2016). Performance reports 
will be published by the CAPDR when they will ask to the IEO to do a specific report about the 
state of the fishery, but most of the information regarding to the day a day activity in the fishery 
is not public. Nevertheless, relevant information about the fishery is included on the website of 
the JJAA, which provides free information for the consumer , for example the report from the 
IEO 2016, the regulation of the fishery included in the BOJA, the contact of the cofradías, access 
to the state of the fishing zones by species (closed or not), etc. Additionally, the CAPDR provide 
                                                 
6http://www.mapama.gob.es/es/pesca/planes-y-estrategias/anexo2013version3final2_tcm7-374733.pdf 
(25/08/2017) 
all the information to the fishers that is not subject of data protection (catch information, scientific 
reports, market information, etc.), and considers that the management is transparent (information 
obtained through personal interview, 2017). Regarding to the management activities, the 
management power is not all concentrated by the CAPDR since AGAPA is in charge of the 
monitoring and enforcement, IEO is in charge of the stock assessment and the cofradías are in 
charge of the administrative duties imposed by the JJAA (management of the expedition centres, 
support in the sampling activities, intermediation between sector and public administration, 
support in administrative activities). The budget of the CAPDR, AGAPA and IEO are public and 
can be accessed through internet and can be audited by external or state agents. When an 
important decision takes place, as the closure, the JJAA publish in its web why the situation is 
taking place and it includes the information needed (i.e. the IEO report of 2016) for justifying the 
decision. However, on a day a day basis the information about the condition of the resource may 
not be accurate, since de previsions of the IEO cannot take into account the volume of Striped 
venus which is fished illegally or sold under the legal minimum size. Management measures o 
prevision could be not what the fishery needs due expected flows of benefits can also not be 
accurate. Management decision are not independent of political or special interest since for 
example the increase of the fleet, which census is closed,  has been also due to provincial and 
local political pressures with the last incorporation of a vessel in the census in 2016 (information 
obtained through personal interview, 2017) 
 
SCORE: 2 
 
 
Appropriate Scale  
 
The Striped venus has a specific fishery management plan centred in the fishery of the zone of 
the gulf of Cádiz. Nevertheless, there is a part of the local condition that is missed in the regulation 
of the Striped venus fishery, the role of the manual dredge. The fishing activity of the mechanized 
dredge is widely regulated, with a periodical revision of the regulation when the status of the 
stock requires it. However, the fleet of manual dredge is barely regulated, except for the minimum 
size of the Striped venus (which is the same for all the fleets targeting Striped venus), the exit 
and entry hours to port (also the same for all the fleets targeting Striped venus) and the 
characteristic of the gear. Contrary to the mechanized dredge fleet, the manual dredge fleet has 
not fishing time restriction. This situation is creating conflict between the mechanized dredge 
fleet and the manual dredge fleet since the first ones think that they are not treated fairly 
(information obtained through personal interview, 2017).  
However we have to point out that, although if it is true that the manual dredge has fewer limits 
for harvesting the resource, there are reasons for not including them in the same regulation. The 
reason is mostly because of the number of species targeted by the manual dredge and the fishing 
capacity of the vessels. Compering to the mechanized dredge, the manual dredge has not the same 
fishing capacity (three times less) and it can target other species (four in total). So, limiting the 
number of hours may not just be as effective as with the mechanized dredge, being also be 
prejudicial for the manual dredge fleet.  
All the same, it is true that a limit has to be established. The ideal catch control measure for the 
manual dredge fleet should be a daily vessel catch limit as the one that they have with the coquina 
(Donax trunculus)  
 
SCORE: 2 
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Social Justice and Empowerment  
 
All rules and regulations pertaining to the Striped venus fishery management of the gulf of Cádiz 
go through a number of different comment periods as described above. During the process 
cofradías can provide comments and suggestions related to the new regulation.  
Yet, the non-inclusion of the manual dredge in the limitation of the effort is perceived as unequal 
and as a threat to the fishing right of the mechanized dredge fleet. A more specific regulation and 
definition of the fishing rights of the manual dredge could help to reduce conflicts between fleets.  
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
Organizational Features Designed to Allow Transfer of Authority (e.g., polycentricity and 
nesting) 
 
Institutional power and interaction is well defined by the Statute of Autonomy and the Law 
1/2002. The management of the Striped venus fishery can be described as multilayered since, 
although the Autonomous Region of Andalucía has exclusive control of its interior water, several 
actors participate in the management of the Striped venus fishery and have specific duties. JJAA 
delegates the management of the fishing resources to the CAPDR, which in turn delegate 
monitoring and enforcement to AGAPA (also part of the JJAA) and the study of the state of the 
stock to the IEO since 2008 through periodical contract renewal between IEO and JJAA (the last 
one in from 2016 until 2020; information obtained through personal interview, 2017). Local 
management and administrative duties are given to the cofradías at a local level.  
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
4.1.2 Societal Enabling Conditions 
 
Capacity for Self-Organization 
 
Each cofradía has a recognised and official leadership, the Patrón Mayor, being chosen among 
the fishing community through a democratic process. The Patrón Mayor represents the fishing 
community itself (vessel owners and fishers) in front of the JJAA. Additionally, within the fleet, 
it seems that there is always someone who has representative power for representing (informally) 
the specific sector, as it happens in Sanlúcar de Barrameda, where one of the vessel owners (he 
owns half the fleet) act as head of the sector in the negotiations (information obtained through 
personal interview, 2017)  
Self-organization and coordination could exist between and within cofradías. All self-imposed 
operational rules (control of the selling and regulation of the effort), are allowed and supported 
by the Autonomous Region, although it is though informal recognition. A good example is the 
self-imposed 120 kg daily Vessel Catch Limit in 2017 after the reopening of the fishery. 
However, self-organization in the sector is normally unsuccessful. Several attempts of self-
regulation have been carried by the cofradías without clear success. In 2013, the mechanized 
dredge fleet self-imposed a catch limitation for the selection of bigger Striped venus when fishing. 
These measures, focused on the control of the Striped venus sold for better prices, lasted shortly, 
and in 2014 fishers started not following this self-imposed management measures (IEO, 2016; 
information obtained through personal interview, 2017).  
Despite the previous commented attempt of self-regulation, the cofradías of the gulf of Cádiz are 
static referring to self-organization, and the agreement of all the fleet is nearly impossible. A clear 
example is the management plan of Sanlúcar de Barrameda, which has not been approved yet. 
(information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
Failure of self-organization and possible conflicts come also from what is perceived by the 
mechanized dredge fleet as unequal regulation between the manual dredge regulation and the 
mechanized dredge regulation. (information obtained through personal interview, 2017) 
Additionally the fact that in some cofradías exist more than one vessels owner association, as in 
Isla Cristina (Asociación de Armadores Asoisamar, Asociación de Armadores Asodraga) could 
increase the difficulty of arriving to a common understanding.  
Regarding to the boundaries and the proximity of the fishing port to the stock, the ports are not 
far away of the fishing zone, although boundaries are not well defined. 
 
SCORE: 2 
 
 
Capacity for Adaptation and Learning 
 
Extensive capacity for adaptation and learning exist in the Gulf of Cádiz. IEO and AGAPA work 
for ensuring that reliable data is available for it use in the Striped venus fishery management 
regulation. This data includes monitoring for estimating the correct volume of catches. 
Additionally, the fishery is relatively small and fishers know each other and know who does not 
comply, being easy for them to monitor and enforce if they want. 
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
Pre-existing Local/ Traditional Organizations 
 
The TURF cofradías system has been in place for centuries, changing its shape for adapting to 
different politic climates. Nowadays, cofradías have a formal role as public consultative organs 
with official recognition by the State, being their duties mainly administrative for supporting the 
fishery management carried by the Autonomous Regions. 
Still, it cannot be said that general trust exists between the cofradías of the Gulf of Cádiz and 
within the cofradías themselves. The relation between manual dredge fleet and mechanized 
dredge fleet is not the best one do to management discrepancies. Also, it is not possible to have 
agreement within the mechanized dredge fleet since there is disagreements and lack of cohesion 
(information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
It is obvious that participants doesn´t discount the future at an appropriate rate, since the fishery 
has being closed 2 times in 6 years due to illegal fishing and excess of fishing effort. 
 
SCORE: 2 
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Social Support and Agreement 
 
Previously we have highlighted that part of the fleet do not comply and self-organization is 
complicated due to different interests, division of opinions and too much passivity from the 
fishers. Nonetheless, is mostly general the elevate interest that all the stakeholders have regarding 
to the importance of the obtaining a sustainable yield of the fishing resource (Cortes, 2016). 
Fishers recognise the role that they have played regarding the depletion of the stock and they 
have assumed the new regulation of the fishery approved in June 2017 even if they are not 
satisfied with it (information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
 
SCORE: 3 
4.2 Property rights´ economic assessment 
 
The property rights of any fishery in the Autonomous Region of Andalucía are allocated under 
the umbrella of the Law 1/2002 of the 4th of April 2002 which establishes the legal framework 
of the fishing activity. The law will not only define how and who holds the fishing right (Title 
III). It will also establish the management measures available for the CAPDR (Title II), the 
definition of the actors intervening in the fishery (Title VI of the law), plus the enforcement 
measures regarding to the illegal fishing (Title X and XI). 
 
Regarding to the allocation of the rights, the third title of the law 1/2002 identify how the right is 
conceded. The article 17 says that for fishing in internal waters, a specific license has to be 
expelled, being the license used for fishing with a mechanized dredge a shellfishing from vessel 
license. The article 19 notes that the vessel that wants to fish on internal waters has to be included 
in a specific census by gear.  
 
In the case of the Striped venus, the Order of the 24th of June 2011, which has settled the 
management plan of the mechanized dredge vessels fishing activity until June 2017 under the 
framework of the law 1/2002, point out that the only vessels that can fish Striped venus are the 
ones included in the census from the Order of the 23rd of September 2008 of shellfishing vessels 
(manual and mechanized dredge both) based in port of the gulf of Cádiz. 
 
Since the right is legally recognised, it can be also evaluable. It characteristics can, if not 
determine, incentive fishers to behave in a way or another. The fishing right is analysed by 
looking at the 4 characteristics of the property right, being these ones (1) Duration, (2) Security, 
(3) Transferability and (4) Exclusivity. 
 
4.2.1 Duration  
 
The decree 387/2010, in its article 6.2, defines that for the shellfishing activity from vessel, the 
validity of the licenses that authorizes the activity will be submitted to the compliance of the 
requisites required by the permanence normative included in the article 7 of the Order of the 23rd 
of September 2008. A specific period of validity is not included, being the right permanent if the 
vessels meet the following conditions sited in the article 7: 
 To confirm to the CAPDR, when required, that the vessel has been fishing at least for 
three months during the previous twelve months since the confirmation has been required 
 In case of buying of substitute a vessel included in the census, to communicate it to the 
CAPDR.   
 
SCORE: 5 
 
 
4.2.2 Security 
 
Rights legally enforceable 
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As previously said, the articles 17 and 19 of the third title of the law 1/2002 identify how the right 
is conceded and the specific regulation of the Striped venus fishery defines who can fish, being 
then the right legally define, and thus enforceable.   
 
Regarding to the enforcement of the right, the Order of the 24th of June 2011 will protect the 
right of the fishers who can target the Striped venus by imposing penalties based on the law 
1/2002. The Order of the 24th of June 2011 establish that any mechanized dredge without license 
or which is not in the census of the mechanized dredge will be penalized, and the infringement 
will be considered as a serious infringement which, following the law 1/2002, will be always 
penalised with a fine that will be between 301€ and 60.000€. An additional penalty could be 
imposed, being these ones: 
 Seizure of the gear/s. 
 Seizure of the catch. 
 Suspension, removal or no renewal of any license for a maximum period of 5 years. 
 Temporal retention of the vessel until the payment of the fine. The vessel can be 
confiscated. 
 Banning for developing any fishing activity for a maximum period of 5 years. 
 Banning for receiving any subvention or public help for a maximum period of 5 years. 
 
Role of the Government in the management of the Striped venus 
 
The title II of the law 1/2002 disposes that the JJAA, through the CAPDR, will establish measures 
targeting the conservation and improvement of the fishing resource. In particular, the article 13 
of the Title II specifies that the CAPDR can establish specific management plans for a concrete 
fishery or for a fishing zone for determining the optimum fishing effort in accord to the situation 
of the resource, always taking into account the socioeconomic conditions of the sector and the 
sustainable use of the resource in the long run. The management plans could: 
 Limit the number of vessels in the fishery 
 Determine convenient the type of vessel and its GRT and kW in accord to the type of 
fishery. 
 Establish the fishing schedule and the days when the fishing activity is allowed, plus the 
days when the fishing activity is prohibited.  
 Limit and define the number and characteristics of the gears used in the fishery. 
 The setting of conservation, protection and recuperation measures. 
 
The conservation, protection and recuperation measures are also indicated in the title II. The title 
6 defines the conservation measures that can be used as: 
 Establishment of minimum sizes for the species targeted by the fishing fleet. 
 Establishment of closed seasons or fishing bans, especially for the species with 
commercial interest. 
 Fishing prohibition of threatened species  
 Establishment of a VCL or a TAC for species, Zones, stocks or periods. 
 
Additional measures as setting of prohibited fishing zones (article 7), MPAs (article 9) and 
Fishery Reserves (article10).  
The Order of the 24th of June 2011 has included mostly all the elements pointed out by the article 
13 additionally to part of the ones pointed out by the article 6 and 7. The Fishery Reserve of the 
Guadalquivir will obviously enter in the definition of the article 10.  
 Co-management Structure 
 
Through Title VI, article 41 of the Law 1/2002 the JJAA recognise the role of the cofradías in the 
management of the fishery by defining their role and the duties that can be assigned or are 
assigned to them by the Public Administration. Their duties, mostly focused to the artisanal sector 
(the Striped venus fishery included), are the following ones: 
 
i. Act as consultative organ of the public administration on the elaboration and application 
of rules that can affect the fishing sector. 
ii. Act as consultative organ of the public administration in the elaboration of studies and 
reports when the public administration asks to. 
iii. Present to the public administration proposals in order to improve the fishing sector (or 
fishery in particular), particularly those proposals that pursue to improve the technical, 
economic and social conditions of the fishing activity, especially in the artisanal sector. 
iv. Act as collaborative organ of the public administration referring to the fishing activity and 
commercialization of the catch. 
v. Promote formation activities related with fisheries for the professionals of the sector 
vi. Act as public offices for the reception, the registration and processing of the 
documentation directed to the CAPDR 
vii. Represent and defend the economic and corporative interests of their member 
 
The cofradías involved in the management of the Striped venus Fishery are: 
 Cofradía of Sanlúcar de Barrameda 
 Cofradía of Punta Umbría 
 Cofradía of Isla Cristina  
 Cofradía of Ayamonte 
 
Illegal fishing 
 
There is presence of illegal fishing activities in the gulf of Cádiz, and although just a small 
percentage of the fleet is commonly breaking the law (7-8%; information obtained through 
personal interview, 2017) it’s enough for provoking a closure as in 2010 and 2016. Illegal 
activities as manipulation and or breaking of the Green Box, fishing activity in the prohibited 
zones, fishing activity during closed seasons and transfer on sea of part of the catch to small boats 
(information obtained through personal interview, 2017). 
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
4.2.3 Transferability 
 
The Order of the 23rd of September 2008 regulates how the right is transferred. Little control is 
applied by the government, being the only requirement for the transfer included in the previously 
cited article 7 of the same order: 
  
 In case of buying a vessel included in the census, it has to be communicated to the CAPDR 
within the 20 days after the acquisition of the vessel. The owner just has to present a copy 
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from the Registro Mercantil de Buques (Vessels Company House) and the new address 
of the owner. 
 
Since the license, and thus the right, is linked to the vessel, the right is not divisible.  
 
Regarding to the ownership, it seems that there is little or inexistent limit on ownership since it 
is common for one person to own more than one vessel in the same cofradía (information obtained 
through personal interview, 2017) 
 
SCORE: 3 
 
 
4.2.4 Exclusivity 
 
Following the flowchart (appendix D, figure 14), and the information previously gathered, we 
can determine the exclusivity of the right. 
 
The cofradía management system could be considered as a TURF, due to the territorial basis. 
However, boundaries limiting the fishing zone of each cofradía do not exist, fishing all the 
cofradías in the same zone (see appendix F). Cooperation and trade-offs between fishers should 
be in place for an effective management and a sustainable use of the resource when no division 
of the fishing zone is in place (Poon & Bonzon, 2013); nevertheless, this elements are not always 
present in the Striped venus fishery. The role of the cofradía will be mostly for: (1) administration 
of the fleet (2) representation of the fleet. 
 
The right in the fishery is, as previously said, an individual right concede through a fishing license 
linked to the vessel as has been previously noted. 
 
No TAC has been used in the fishery before the closure of November 2016, and no informal 
harvest rules have been in place during the period between the Order of 2011 and the closure of 
2016.  
 
SCORE: 2 
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Chapter 5 Discussion 
 
The discussion contains three parts. Firstly, the results of the governance assessment are 
reviewed and discussed taking into account the effect that the governance attributes 
analysed are having over the resource Secondly, the results of the property rights´ 
economic assessment will be discussed contrasting the results of the analysis with the 
behaviour observed in the fishery. Finally we will contrast the results obtained with the 
literature reviewed.  
 
5.1 Governance 
 
A significant gap in the governance has been detected due to the absence of an efficient 
enforcement mechanism which is affecting the attaining of sustainable outcomes. 
Although the means exist for the CAPDR to monitor and enforce the fishery properly, 
those mechanisms are not working. The increase of the number of the illegal fishing 
activities in 2014 and manipulations of the Green Boxes are a clear example of this 
statement. Plus, even if the illegal fishing activity is commonly carried by a small part of 
the fleet, the inefficient enforcement produces a waterfall effect that stimulates more non-
compliance. The CAPDR is being permissive with non-compliance and cofradías do not 
self-impose enforcement and monitoring measures, which do not help when managing 
the fishery. 
 
The lack of social cohesion and capacity of self-organization in the gulf of Cádiz is also 
affecting to the efficiency of the governance. The actual co-management system is 
considered flexible and gives to the different actors of the fishery the possibility of being 
represented participating in the regulatory process and of presenting their own proposals. 
However, the system is not effective since the cofradías do not have the technical capacity 
for proposing reasonable measures. Cofradías can self-regulate and take more 
management responsibilities if the self-imposed measures do not enter into conflict with 
the regulation in place. But, self-regulation is rare and inexistent in the period studied, 
except for some punctual attempts in 2013. Cofradías are not prone to propose new rules 
or even support the ones proposed by other cofradías. Even if numerous meetings are hold 
within the fishing sector, they do not normally arrive to consensus or to new ways of 
solving the problems in the fishery. Proposals are only made when the situation is critical 
(as in the closure of 2016) and there is no to many regulatory options.  
 
Some of the former deficiencies seem to be partially mitigated by other of the governance 
attributes studied. The strong regulatory authority, clear goals aligned with conservation 
and sustainability and the science based decision making had allowed to the Autonomous 
Region of Andalucía to cope with the gaps present in the system. The direct control of 
the CAPDR and the continuous following of the fishery by the IEO and AGAPA have 
allowed regulating and adjusting the fishing regulation when new regulations have been 
needed. This proper response, additionally to reproductive and growth characteristics of 
the Striped venus, have enable to avoid a worst situation, intervening the CAPDR when 
the resource has been in danger by closing the fishery or imposing new regulation. 
 
It could be possible that the vessel owners association is also contributing to the lack of 
cohesion, conflicts and to inefficient governance. Since there are both represented by the 
cofradías and the vessels owner association, it is possible that this duplicity is creating 
inefficiencies in the representation system. However enough information has not be 
gathered for identify these hypothesis. The role of the vessel owners association need to 
be further investigated. 
 
Although, all the stakeholders participate in the negotiations and the FACOPE acts as 
representative of the cofradías for leveling the field, enough information has not been 
gathered for correctly define the role played by FACOPE. 
 
5.2 Property rights 
 
Regarding to the individual interests, the analysis through property rights´ economic 
assessment shows that the license system in the fishery of the Striped venus is far away 
of being close to the perfect property right standard (Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15: Radar diagram of property rights’ economic characteristics of the Striped venus clam fishery. 
 
It could consider that there is a combination of property rights in the fishery with (1) a 
community right (TURF) and then (2) an allocation of individuals property rights (LL). 
The combination of both rights should provide better characteristics than the ones shown. 
However, even if could be considered a TURF, the effect of the territorial right over the 
individual right is considered inexistent, since considering that no boundaries are limiting 
fishing zones, collaboration between cofradías should exist and it does not.  
 
When looking closely at the results of the property rights’ economic assessment, the 
highest score was obtained when looking at the duration of the right, being this one 
permanent. Theoretically, it should stimulate sustainable behaviour of the owner and even 
the investment for reducing cost, increasing selectivity, increase catchability, etc. 
However the state of the resource and the number of non-compliance cases suggest a 
Duration
Exclusivity
Security of the title
Transferability
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completely different type of behaviour, which could be caused by other the other 
characteristics. 
 
The security level, even without having a theoretical low score (3), could be providing a 
different image to the fishers, being the real security perceived lower than theoretically 
should. As previously described, the right is not usually efficiently enforced. The 
government is transparent but the measures, even if agreed by the fishing sector, seem 
more an imposition than a negotiation. Actually this could not be in other way, mostly 
because of the passivity of the fishers, which provides an inefficient co-management.  
 
The lowest score is obtained when analyzing exclusivity. Low exclusivity over the 
resource, where not even informal catch limit or spatial boundaries exists and where 
illegal fishing is common, has provoked an increase of the illegal fishing activities, the 
increase of the real fishing effort and the consequent overharvest.  
 
We consider here that the transferability, even with a medium score, do not have any 
effect in the behaviour of the fishermen and on the possibilities that can offer to the fishery 
since the right is ligated to a vessel, being then the right non divisible.  
 
It has to be pointed out that the analysis and evaluation of the characteristics of the 
property right and its impacts over individual interests and behavior are theoretical and 
are based on observations, bibliographical review and interviews with members of the 
IEO, AGAPA, JJAA and the Cofradía of Sanlúcar de Barrameda. An empirical analysis 
through questionnaire could be useful for finding out the real perception of these 
characteristics by the fisher and for confirming or rejecting the theoretical hypothesis. 
 
5.3 Previous studies 
 
The results of the thesis support the conclusions of Alegret about the cofradía system in 
Spain and Catalonia (1999a, 2009) and its change since the 80´s. The cofradías have a 
lack of capacity to create any real internal discussion and they approach general problems 
from a strictly local point of view (each port, each cofradía), thinking and acting locally 
instead of globally. The fact that the cofradías do not have bargaining process due to the 
fact that they only do proposals when the situation is critical there is no many regulatory 
options has been also pointed by him.  
 
Also, the results suggest that the cofradía co-management system in the gulf of Cádiz do 
not gather some of the elements identified by other authors as common for a successful 
co-management of the resource as (1) lack of well-defined boundaries (Pomeroy, 2001; 
Jentoft, 2009), (2) the lack of social cohesion due to the atomization of the fishing 
community when managing a common resource (Pomeroy, 2001; Gutierrez et al. 2011; 
Crona et al., 2016) and (3) the lack of proper enforcement(Pomeroy 2001; Gutierrez, et 
al. 2011; Crona et al., 2016).  
 
The effect of the social cohesion over other elements of governance shows that as found 
by Battista et al. (2016), the relationship between several attributes (in that case the social 
cohesion) is more important that the single studies of governance attributes. 
 
Contrary to Franquesa (2004) and in line with Alegret (1998), the initial idea of the 
Cofradías system being a proper TURF has been criticized and its efficiency undervalued. 
The fishing area of each cofradía is not well defined fishing all the vessels in the same 
fishing zone, while being the fleets from 4 different cofradías and 5 ports. Each cofradía 
is independent and has been previously seen, there is lack of cohesion which leads to 
management inefficiencies.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
After analysing the coastal governance system and the property rights of the Striped venus 
fishery, some conclusion can be drawn. 
  
First and foremost, different fleets from different cofradías fish the same resource and in the same 
zone, however, little self-organization and self-regulation exist in the fishery due to the lack of 
cohesion between cofradías. Clear rules within the fleets targeting Striped venus about who can 
fish, where and how are missed (there is no clear boundaries or self-imposed catch limits) and, 
taking into account the difficult cooperation and lack of consensus between cofradías, this rules 
are unlikely to appear. This makes the actual individual license system poorly exclusive (closer 
to open access). The increase of fishing effort and the increase of the number on non-compliance 
cases are a clear example of the race for fish in the fishery. 
 
Moreover, when talking about non-compliance, it is evident that the lack of efficient enforcement 
mechanisms does not help in solving the situation. The enforcement mechanisms of the JJAA 
have proven to be ineffective, and the cofradías do not control the behaviour of their fleets. Taking 
into account that the effort limits on the regulation have been imposed estimating the maximum 
effort for the fishery to be sustainable, the high number of non-compliance cases makes the 
regulation also inefficient (even if based in scientific information).  
 
Last but not least, the lack of cohesion and the inefficient enforcement mechanism could lead the 
fishermen to perceive the right insecure, being more likely for the fishers to not behave in accord 
with the sustainability of the stock, whether it be by participating in the management or acting 
sustainably. 
 
In conclusion, the coastal governance and the rights present in the fishery are not contributing to 
the sustainability of the Striped venus fishery. The coastal governance presents problems that 
should be solved as the high number of cofradías accessing the same resource and the lack of 
effective enforcement. Since no real co-management is in place and cofradías are not playing 
their role efficiently, it is unlikely that any measure, including the TAC approved in 2017, is 
going to work in the future efficiently.  
 
The reduction of the number of cofradías or the union of the existing ones could reduce the 
cohesion problems and maybe stimulate a better management. The division of the fishing zone 
creating real TURFs by cofradías could be also an option for increasing the exclusivity of the 
right, since each cofradía will have exclusive access and management duties over a portion of the 
resource, not over all of it.  
 
Although the sharing of the TAC is a competence of the cofradías, the JJAA could establish an 
IQ (transferable or not) for solving exclusivity problems. In fact this measure could allow solving 
the problem of the lack of regulation about the effort of the manual dredge over the resource, 
defining better the part of Striped venus that they can catch. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: People consulted for the analysis 
 
 Alejandro Terrón Sigler, AGAPA. Coordinator of the fishing resources of Andalucía. 
Interviewed by email on March 9th, 2017 and by phone on March 23rd, 2017 email 
personal communication, March 23, 2017 
 
 Jorge L. Campos Uclés, Secretary of FACOPE, Interviewed by phone August 11, 2017 
 
 José Carlos Macías, cofradía of Sanlúcar de Barrameda. Technician of the cofradía 
Interviewed by email on August 17th, 2017 and by phone on August 18th, 2017. 
 
 Marina Delgado, IEO - Cádiz. Researcher involved in the biological monitoring project 
of the Striped venus in the Gulf of Cádiz. Interviewed by phone 16 August, 2017 
 
 Rodrigo Sánchez Haro, CAPDR. Andalusian Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Rural Development. Interviewed by email on July 31st, 2017 
 
Appendix B: Questions used to guide interviews 
 
Since each interviewee has a different role in the fishery and the objective was to obtain the 
maximum information about the relation between stakeholders and the coastal governance, all 
the questions were somewhat free form, such that if an interviewee had more to say about one 
topic than another he or she was allowed to guide the conversation. 
  
However, all of the below questions where addressed at least briefly with each interviewee.   
 
1. What is your role in the management of the Striped venus fishery? 
 
2. Who monitors the state of the resource and how is it done? 
 
3. Who takes the decisions when the management plan is created and what is the elaboration 
process? 
 
4. Who is in charge of the enforcement of the Striped venus fishery? 
 
5. Are the actual enforcement mechanisms and monitoring resources enough for ensuring 
compliance in the chiral fishery? 
 
6. Does the JJAA take into account the dependence of the fishing sector over the resource 
account when regulating the fishing activity? 
 
7. Does the JJAA stimulate the participation of the fishers in the management of the fishery? 
How does the fishing sector participate in the management of the fishery? 
 
8. If the sector has proposed management measures, which measures has proposed? Are the 
proposals reasonable? 
 
9. Taking into account the evolution of the fishery, do you consider that regulations included 
in the actual management plan have been the correct ones? 
 
10. How does the government proceed for taking the management decisions and for 
establishing the objectives? Are the objectives clear and well defined? Are all the 
stakeholders of the fishery involved in the establishment of the management objectives 
and principles? 
 
11. Is the management fully transparent? Is there enough communication between fishers and 
government for them to know what is happening? 
 
12. What do you think about the relation between the cofradías? Do they have any type of 
agreement for sharing the resource? In case of establishing TAC, do you think that they 
would share the Total Allowable Catch in an equitable way? 
 
13. What do you think about the capacity of self-regulation and self-organization of the 
cofradías? 
 
14. Is it recognised the right of the sector for managing the resource or is an exclusive duty 
of the JJAA? 
 
15. Does the JJAA give specific responsibilities to the sector referring to their right of use the 
resource? 
 
16. When talking about the licenses of the fishery of the Striped venus, would the fleet be 
increased in the future? 
 
17. Is the sector aware of the importance of the sustainable use of the resource? Which role 
does the administration have regarding to the awareness of the sector. 
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Appendix C: Master list of effective governance attributes and definitions 
 
The following table (Table 7) includes all the attributes that EDF has compiled as necessary for good conservation outcomes. 
 
Table 7: Master list of effective governance attributes and definitions 
  Attribute Amended definition 
Structural attributes Regulatory authority _ The authority (granted by statute) to develop, adopt, and implement rules and regulations within a given 
management jurisdiction or over a particular resource or set of resources, evaluate the efficacy of those 
decisions, and adjust them over time. 
Efficient enforcement 
mechanisms 
_ Mechanisms to enforce compliance with rules should be available to those tasked with monitoring those 
rules. 
_ Sanctions should increase with repeat offenses and in congruence to the severity of the offences. 
Governance goals aligned 
with conservation objectives 
_ Ecosystem values are identified, including ecosystem connections, conservation status, state of ecosystem 
integrity and critical habitat for utilized and non-utilized species. 
_ Rules are developed that limit resource use, with a focus on maintaining the natural structure and function 
of the ecosystem. 
Science-based decision 
making 
_ Decision-making under established policy must be based on the best available science. 
_ Where significant scientific uncertainty exists, the precautionary principle should guide decision-making. 
_ Local knowledge should be integrated 
_ All sources of understanding need to be mobilized- management may benefit from the combination of 
different knowledge systems. 
_ Social incentives for ecological knowledge generation need to be in place. 
Agency flexibility  _ Institutions should be capable of adapting to new situations in ways that are appropriate to the relevant 
respects in which the situation has changed. 
_ Institutions should not change fundamentally when a situational change is not really relevant to the system. 
Explicit recognition of 
tradeoffs 
_ Agencies must have formalized mechanisms to make choices if and when goals or values conflict with each 
other. 
Dependable funding _ State (or other legal authority) must guarantee sufficient and dependable funding to the effort. 
_ Credit opportunities should be provided to local organizations for creation and maintenance of cooperative 
services. 
_ Aid should be provided to local users in exchange for conservation services. 
Participation  _ Stakeholder engagement must be institutionalized, incorporated as early as possible, carried out 
consistently throughout the management and rule-making process. 
_ Engagement must include rapid dissemination of information, materials, public comments, etc. 
_ All individuals affected by rules must be able to participate in changing them (collective choice 
arrangements). 
Systematic representation _ Relevant stakeholders need to be identified, analysed, and represented systematically. 
_ Institutions should have formal mechanisms for “leveling the playing field” during negotiations.  
Attribute Amended definition 
Structural attributes Deliberation _ A process of open communication, discussion, and reflection among actors who have alternative political 
viewpoints and understandings should include debate, decent, mediation, and negotiation. Highly skilled 
facilitation is necessary. 
_ Conflict resolution mechanisms must exist. 
Clear decision making rules _ Decision-making rules should be established up front, leaving no ambiguity regarding how decision 
outcomes will be achieved. 
Clear objectives and 
directives 
_ Management system should set forth overarching principles, clear tasks, deadlines for completing tasks, 
directives explaining the standards by which decisions will be measured and made, and the processes for 
making those decisions. 
_ Objectives should be developed among stakeholders to represent shared vision. 
_ Objectives and directives should be agreed on at the outset in order to inform participatory process. 
_ Periodic review should be carried out to determine progress. 
_ System (biophysical) and institutional boundaries should be clearly defined. 
Accountability and 
Transparency 
_ Managing agents should be accountable to both local communities and higher authorities. 
_ Mechanisms for transparency and accountability such as independent monitoring, clear milestone 
deadlines, linking funding with achievement or performance, issuing performance reports for public 
consumption, polycentricity, separation of powers, legal recourse, budget control, and a free media should 
be incorporated into all levels of the governance hierarchy. 
_ Management systems should provide for maximum transparency so that the basis for data analysis and 
decision-making is unambiguous and the process by which decisions are made is obvious as the decisions 
are under consideration. 
_ Management decisions should be publicly defensible. 
_ Accurate information about the condition of the resource and the expected flow of benefits and costs should 
be available at low cost. 
_ Management decisions should be independent of political and/or special interest agendas to reduce the 
potential for “agency capture” or political gridlock. 
_ Institutions should be sensitive to the complex (sometimes self-serving) motivations of social actors.  
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Appropriate scale  _ Scale of appropriation rules (restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource available for 
use) and provision rules (requiring labour) should be congruent with local conditions and scaled to local 
system. 
_ Institutional arrangements should be variable across spatial and temporal scales, and should encourage 
experimentation in different places as well as take lessons learned elsewhere into account. 
Social Justice and 
empowerment 
_ Managing entities should engage in proactive efforts to address inequities in the distribution of rights, 
benefits, and involuntary risks. 
_ Institutions must have mechanisms to actually respond to feedback provided during participatory process. 
 
Attribute Amended definition 
Structural attributes Organizational features 
designed to allow transfer of 
authority 
_ Multi-layered (nested) and/or polycentric governance hierarchies must allow for authority to be transferred 
to different levels to prevent corruption and improve efficiency. 
_ Institutional relationships/ interactions/ power sharing should be formalized and transparent. Coordination 
among agencies should be designed to reduce the bureaucratic burden. 
_ Attributes of larger scale institutions (i.e., federal government agencies) should be designed to facilitate 
smaller scale, more local institutions to achieve their goals. 
_ Smaller scale institutions should be designed to foster leadership and social capital. 
Societal enabling 
conditions 
Capacity for self-
organization 
_ Strong local leadership that must be familiar with local traditions and changing external conditions. 
_ High capacity and self-organization exists to free the system from the need to be continually invested in, 
subsidized, or replenished from outside. 
_ Participants should have the autonomy to make many of their own operational rules which if made 
legitimately, will not be interfered with, and even potentially will be supported and enforced by, external 
authorities. 
_ Participants should use collective-choice rules that fall between the extremes of unanimity or control by a 
few (or by bare majority) and thus avoid high transaction or high deprivation costs. 
_ Participant groups should be small enough to enable ease of cooperation. 
_ Users should be located close to the resource. 
_ User group boundaries should be clearly defined. 
Capacity for adaptation and 
learning 
_ The system is enabled to cope with nonlinearities or other forms of surprise and uncertainty; to detect hard-
to-reverse thresholds in a timely manner; and improve fit between rules and ecosystems even as they go 
through dynamic cycles. 
_ Participants can develop relatively accurate and low-cost monitoring and sanctioning arrangements. Pre-
existing local/traditional organizations. 
_ Local and traditional organizations should serve as the foundation for more formalized management 
organizations. 
 _ Participants should share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust, based on past successful experiences 
in group functioning that can be used as initial social capital. 
_ Participants must not discount the future at a high rate. 
Social support and 
agreement 
_ Participants should be relatively homogenous in regard to information and preferences about the use of the 
resource.  
_ Interdependence should exist among group members.  
_ Participants must share a common understanding about the potential benefits and risks associated with the 
continuance of the status quo as contrasted with changes in norms and rules that they could feasibly adopt.  
_ The group using the resource should be relatively small and stable. 
Source: From "a Comprehensive Method for Assessing Marine Resource Governance: Case Study in Kãne'ohe Bay, Hawai'i"by W. Battista et al., 2016, Coastal management, 
44,p. 297-299 
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Appendix D: Exclusivity flowchart 
 
The following flowchart (Figure 16) has been created in order to identify the degree of exclusivity 
of the fishing right present in the fishery. 
 
It should be noticed that, although informal allocation rules have been recognized, the analyse of 
CMT rights was avoided since it could be a study by itself. The flowchart will be used for the 
analyse of regulated fisheries. 
Regarding to the scoring, the criteria followed for giving the score was the degree of definition 
of the access and the likelihood of overlapping of the fishing right. 
The maximum score (5), was given to individual TURF and to IQ since the right is perfectly 
define. 
The minimum score (1) is given to the open access, since there is no property right.   
The other scores were given taking into account that: 
 The establishment TAC or Annual catch limit would help to define better fishing rights, 
even if they are not allocated through formal allocation mechanisms. 
 Informal access/harvest rules could increase the possibility of a better defined right, 
although is less enforceable due to its informal character. 
 
Regarding to community rights, it was considered that, within the community, individual rights 
will be granted for fishing, having licenses been included according to this argument. Individual 
quotas and individual territorial rights do not need to have included a license layer, since they 
normally are already attached to a license (boats or fishers). 
 Figure 16: Flowchart for evaluating exclusivity 
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Appendix E: Evolution of the Fishing Capacity from 2011 to 2016 
 
Table 8: Evolution of the fishing capacity of the fleet from 2011 to 2016 
 
2011 2016 Variation rate from 2011 to 2016 
Port No. 
Vessels  
Average 
GRT 
Average 
power (kW) 
No. 
Vessels  
Average 
GRT 
Average 
power (kW) 
No. 
Vessels  
Average 
GRT 
Average 
power (kW) 
AYAMONTE 5 9,17 55,04 2 9,92 69,5 -60% 9% 26% 
CHIPIONA 1 8,41 58,87 1 7,47 80 0% -11% 36% 
HUELVA 1 8,93 89,04 1 13,41 121 0% 50% 36% 
ISLA CRISTINA 30 12,50 76,33 37 12,14 103,65 23% -3% 36% 
LEPE 7 19,72 118,69 7 14,32 161,29 0% -27% 36% 
PUNTA UMBRIA 34 14,61 84,51 33 13,22 118,21 -3% -9% 40% 
SANLÚCAR DE 
BARRAMEDA 
18 10,89 82,41 15 11,42 112,19 -17% 5% 36% 
TOTAL 96 12,02 80,70 96 12,48 111,97 0% 4% 39% 
Source: Data of 2016 from Cortés Rodríguez, C. (2016). La técnica multicriterio de programación por metas en la gestión de la pesquería de chirla (“Chamelea gallina”) de la 
región suratlántica Española. Data of 2011 from the Order of the 24th of June 2011 (BOJA No. 128, 1st July 2011). 
 
Appendix F: Fishing zones in the Gulf of Cádiz 
 
It has to be noticed that there is no ore 6 months closures in the zone C, which coincide 
with the zone D or the Fihing Reserve of the Guadalquivir. 
 
 
Figure 17: Fishing Zone of Striped venus. Huelva Información 
(http://www.huelvainformacion.es/provincia/estudio-caladero-chirla-
entredicho_0_434357285.html ) 
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